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Illegitimacy and the Power of the Mother in the Lais of Marie de France
Claudia McCarron
Critical scholarship on the lais of Marie de France has tended to focus on Marie’s portrayal of romantic and courtly love—an understandable preoccupation, given 
that each of her twelve poems concerns the trials and tribulations of a 
heterosexual couple. Glyn S. Burgess encapsulates this view when he writes 
that “[t]he theme of love is certainly the fundamental preoccupation of the 
Lais” (ix). Less attention, however, has been given to the children born as 
a result of these affairs, their function within Marie’s medieval worldview, 
and the challenges they present for their parents, even though three of the 
lais, “Milun,” “Yonec,” and “Le Fresne,” prominently feature illegitimate 
children. Given that illegitimacy and its discriminatory social repercussions 
occupy a significant space in the modern imagination, from the plays of 
Shakespeare to HBO’s hit television series Game of Thrones, it is surprising 
to learn that the attitudes towards extramarital sex and bastardy expressed in 
these lais and medieval culture in general were much more complex than is 
often assumed. 
Popular belief that the life of bastards in medieval Europe was rife 
with religious persecution stems from the sense that their parents had com-
mitted a sinful act and that the children were thus morally suspect. Since 
this belief has been prevalent since early modern times, it is not unreason-
able to hypothesize that such discrimination grew from “early medieval 
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Christian doctrine” (McDougall 1). However, a closer look into the com-
plicated dynastic politics of medieval Europe paints a strikingly different 
picture. Historians have pointed out that “[b]efore the late eleventh century, 
it must have been very difficult to say whether a man was a bastard or not” 
since “monogamy was not well established” and “formal marriage was 
widely considered to be unnecessary” (Given-Wilson and Curteis 42). Since 
ideas about legitimate marriage were not firmly established, neither were 
ideas about what marked a child as legitimate or illegitimate. Sarah McDou-
gall builds on these findings in Royal Bastards, her study of the development 
of bastardy in the ninth through thirteenth centuries. McDougall convinc-
ingly argues that “lineage,” not a religiously sanctioned marriage, “played 
the fundamental role” in determining whether a child had the familial and 
political connections necessary to inherit (5). In a time when many noble-
men married and divorced with abandon, the ancestry of the mother was 
of crucial importance. If she came from a powerful, well-connected family, 
she would be able to pass on these advantageous ties to her child, ensuring 
political power not only to the child, but also to whatever vassalage he or 
she might inherit. Whether the mother had an advantageous lineage was 
often a crucial factor in whether her child was considered a legitimate heir 
or not, as “lineage mattered far more than legality” (14). McDougall uses 
this view, gleaned from a careful study of medieval law and court cases, to 
re-evaluate the history of bastardy, revealing its deeply political and gen-
dered nature. 
It is undeniable that bastardy holds a noteworthy place in Marie’s 
lais, and a close reading of “Milun,” “Yonec,” and “Le Fresne” demonstrates 
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her artistic use of the contemporary perceptions McDougall describes. The 
trajectory of the lais concerns the reinstating of illegitimate children as true 
heirs and members of legitimate families—a development that hinges, in 
all cases, on maternal lineage and involvement. When read together, these 
three lais present a pragmatic politics of bastardy that characterizes Marie’s 
medieval worldview and provides a method for the maternal legitimation, 
valuation, and enfranchisement of bastard children. Such a pattern reveals 
the power available to women within the boundaries of a patriarchal society 
and how Marie manipulates these boundaries to provide her female charac-
ters with agency in love, motherhood, and societal positions.  
While the Harley 978 manuscript, on which most modern transla-
tions of the lais base their arrangement, places “Le Fresne” first, followed 
by “Yonec” and “Milun,” it is most helpful for my purposes to reverse this 
order. Such a reversal does not present significant issues, as there is no 
historical or critical consensus regarding the composition dates of the lais 
(Burgess 2-3), and the Harley manuscript, in all likelihood, does not reflect 
Marie’s own arrangement. Reading “Milun” as the first of the lais concerned 
with bastardy followed by “Yonec” and “Le Fresne” shows a clearer develop-
ment of Marie’s use of illegitimacy as a means for maternal empowerment. 
“Milun” establishes the figure of the mother in a secondary but 
crucial role that emphasizes her ability to legitimize her child through her 
aristocratic connections. Marie begins the poem by claiming that she will 
present “a variety of beginnings” (“Milun” line 2), an appropriate disclaimer 
for a narrative preoccupied with the effects of an extramarital birth on both 
the child and his parents. Milun, the father, is “a good knight” who is famed 
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for his skill at jousting (11-13). This prowess catches the attention of the 
unnamed daughter of a baron who takes him as her lover (28). While the 
fact that the girl is never given a name can be read as a form of objectifica-
tion, it also emphasizes her position as the daughter of a powerful family, 
establishing her social superiority in relation to Milun. As the daughter of a 
nobleman, she comes from a landed family who do not have to depend on 
knightly competitions or “martial exploits” (124) to win honor and financial 
stability as her lover must. The girl occupies, by value of her birth, a posi-
tion above Milun’s, which allows her a measure of control over him. 
This control manifests itself once she becomes pregnant. Recog-
nizing that the discovery of her condition will result in the loss “of her 
honor and her good name” (“Milun” 58), she meets with Milun to discuss 
the problem. He defers to her authority, saying he will “do / whatever she 
counsel[s]” (65-66), a choice that at first seems unusual. Milun’s male-
ness should privilege him over his lover, giving him the responsibility for 
deciding the future of their child. His deference to his lover reveals that, as 
powerful as the medieval patriarchy was, it was also flexible enough to allow 
exceptions where questions of class and status were concerned. Milun’s lover 
is a striking literary example of this flexibility, as her superior social standing 
provides her with the power to decide her child’s future. Such power would 
not be available to her if she were married to a man of the same or greater 
social standing than herself (later in the lai, her freedom will be severely cur-
tailed by marriage to a social equal). While extramarital love and pregnancy 
do present significant problems for the girl, they also allow her an agency 
when resolving those problems—agency that would not be available to her 
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in a lawful marriage. This irony sets the tone for the maternally focused 
politics of bastardy that continues to be developed throughout the three lais. 
In deciding her son’s future, Milun’s lover takes care to preserve his 
maternal aristocratic lineage. Once he is born, she tasks Milun with trans-
porting him to her sister, “a rich woman, worthy and prudent” (“Milun” 
70). Having her son raised within her family ensures that he will have access 
to the benefits conferred on him by his mother’s social status. While the 
letter that accompanies the infant does disclose the identity of his father 
(79), Marie allocates more lines to the girl’s instructions to her sister: “this 
child belongs to [your] sister, / … make sure that he’s well nourished” (73-
75). These lines lay out the girl’s expectation that her son will not simply be 
given a place to stay; he will also be cared for in a way that acknowledges his 
maternal lineage. The letter demonstrates how, in medieval literature and 
society, “lineage mattered” far more than the marital status of the parents 
(McDougall 165). While Milun and the girl’s child is read as illegitimate by 
modern readers, the lai itself makes clear that his mother’s position guaran-
tees that the boy is “cherished” (“Milun” 120) by his aunt, who treats him as 
a legitimate child, ensuring that he is “dubbed a knight” (292) and given all 
of the privileges that his mother’s status bequeaths to him.    
While the boy is treated as if he were legitimate son and heir 
throughout his childhood, in adulthood he serves as the device to legitimize 
the union of his parents, chiefly through the ancestral benefits passed on 
to him by his mother. The girl herself becomes a much more passive figure 
after she is forcibly wedded to “a rich lord of the region” (“Milun” 127), 
although she and Milun still carry on their affair. Her work to establish her 
14 MCCARRON
son’s social standing earlier in the lai, however, ensures that he possesses 
the position and resources that will enable him to find his father. Chief of 
these resources is the ring that Milun gave his lover, which she decides to 
bequeath to their child (77). The ring, which serves as a physical proof of 
Milun’s fatherhood, complements the girl’s gift of ancestry by becoming 
a representation of Milun’s gallantry and knightly prowess. While Milun’s 
recognition of the ring is what eventually unites him and his son (435-37), 
the young man’s childhood as a privileged member of the aristocracy and 
the uncertainty surrounding his conception—all ensured and engineered by 
his mother—are what enable him to develop into a more proficient knight 
than Milun. Discovery of his father’s identity, for instance, prompts him to 
determine to “seek out even greater renown” than his (311). Although this 
development at first seems to value Milun over the mother, it was she who 
decided when and how Milun’s identity would be revealed to the boy (81-
86). Her decisions are what eventually bring the two together when Milun 
challenges the young man to a joust in order to restore his reputation as an 
unmatched knight. After he is unhorsed, Milun recognizes the boy’s ring 
and the two have a joyful meeting (477-78). The son determines to unite his 
parents, even though it means killing his mother’s husband (500-501). His 
plans to clear the path for the legitimation of their marriage prove unneces-
sary, however, as they learn that the husband has conveniently died (518). 
Marie is clear that it is still the son who “brought them together, / gave his 
mother to his father” (529-30). He is able to do this not only because he 
is a flesh and blood symbol of their love, but also because his maleness and 
the position his mother gave him as a member of the nobility allow him to 
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inherit and supersede her authority, enabling him to sanction her marriage 
to a man of lesser social standing. This move both proves the power of his 
maternal lineage and legitimizes him. 
In “Yonec,” the second of the lais dealing with illegitimacy that I 
will discuss, the role of the mother in legitimizing and liberating her child 
expands and develops the pattern of power through maternal lineage by 
focusing on moral rather than social superiority. Despite the lai’s title, 
Yonec’s mother is the focus of most of the poem’s 554 lines. Like Milun’s 
lover, she comes “from a good family” (“Yonec” 22) and is unwillingly mar-
ried to a “rich man” (12). Her husband proves to be not only unattractive, 
but also jealous, and in order to prevent her from taking a younger lover, 
he keeps her “locked … inside his tower” (27).  The girl may not be her 
husband’s social superior, but she clearly far outstrips him as far as moral-
ity is concerned. Bemoaning her isolation and loneliness, she exclaims that 
“My fate is very harsh. / …What is this jealous old man afraid of?” (68, 71). 
She notes that he has prevented her from attending church (75), a nota-
ble stricture in medieval Europe’s highly Christianized culture. Even more 
damning, the girl knows that his suspicions are unfounded, and if he were 
to set her free, she promises that she would be “very gracious to my lord / 
even if I didn’t want to be” (79-80). In her final condemnation of him, the 
girl claims that her husband was “baptized / … in the river of hell” (88-89). 
The man’s cruelty and selfishness have marked him as unworthy of his more 
virtuous and dutiful wife, negating his rights as a husband. This negation is 
demonstrated by the fact that God Himself sanctions the girl’s extramari-
tal affair. Immediately after she prays for a lover (103-104), a hawk flies 
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in through the tower window and transforms into “a handsome and noble 
knight” (115). The girl’s moral superiority takes the place of the social supe-
riority of Milun’s lover, enabling her in a similar manner to make decisions 
regarding her relationships and sexuality. 
The girl’s moral purity not only becomes a crucial part of the 
lineage that she passes on to her son, but it also allows her to conflate and 
assume the roles of both father and mother. Her morality is further proven 
by her loyalty to her fairy lover, Muldumarec. Both he and she treat their 
relationship as a legitimate marriage rather than a shameful affair. In fact, 
they even undergo a marriage ceremony of sorts. After declaring that she 
will only “take him as her lover / if he believe[s] in God” (“Yonec” 138-39), 
she arranges for him to take the Eucharist (187-88). This ceremony involves 
the couple lying together side by side while a chaplain administers the 
sacrament. Both the religious ritual and the sexual intimacy foreshadowed 
by their physical closeness parallel a Christian marriage ceremony. Their 
relationship after this ceremony likewise suggests a renewing, pure love 
rather than sinful passion, as they share a mental as well as physical intimacy 
that proves redemptive for the girl. By finding companionship, her life once 
again “become[s] precious to her” (215), and she longs for “her love all the 
time” (219). For his part, Muldumarec is courteous and attentive, promising 
to visit her “whenever” she “please[s]” (199). By undercutting the authority 
of the girl’s legal husband, Marie creates a space for her heroine that allows 
her to determine her own fate. The fact that she chooses a God-fearing, 
kind-hearted man to share her life with and that she binds herself to him 
through a Christian ceremony vindicates her to a medieval audience and 
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further cements her morality, which ensures that her child, when he is born, 
will be as deserving as any child born to a legally married couple. Her loy-
alty to Muldumarec also prepares her for the process of taking on his role, 
and passing on a paternal as well as a maternal legacy to their child.
The girl is forced to take on the paternal role due to the brutal 
murder of Muldumarec. In a final proof of his reprobation, her husband’s 
jealousy over her newfound happiness prompts him to investigate and 
discover her affair. Rather than confronting her with the knowledge, he 
instead devises a brutal trap to kill her lover, mounting “great spikes of iron” 
(“Yonec” 286) on the outside of the tower window. When the girl innocent-
ly calls Muldumarec to her, he is wounded by the spikes. Freeing himself 
and flying through the window, he “alight[s] on the bed . . . / staining the 
bedclothes with blood” (315-16). This juxtaposition of imagery related to 
both birth and death is supported by Muldumarec’s announcement that 
not only is he mortally wounded, but his lover is also “pregnant with his 
child” (320, 327). In addition, the girl assumes her new role as a paternal 
figure. When Muldumarec flies back to the fairy kingdom he rules over, she 
follows him, telling him that she “would rather die” than spend the rest of 
her life with her husband (411). However, he urges her to return, providing 
her with a ring that will make her husband treat her kindly, and giving her 
a sword she is to pass on to their son when he comes of age. He also gives 
her the responsibility of telling their son “the story of his death, / how he 
was wrongfully killed” (431-32). This responsibility to remember and tell 
his history makes the girl responsible for transferring both her and Muldu-
marec’s lineage to Yonec. While the circumstances surrounding this confla-
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tion are undeniably tragic, combining the maternal and paternal lineages 
makes her the ultimate authority regarding the future status of her child. 
By passing on her lineage of moral purity to Yonec, the girl makes 
certain that he will be prepared to take on his father’s royal legacy. She takes 
pains to raise him to be a pure and noble man, as the lai relates that “Her 
son was born and nourished, / protected and cherished” (“Yonec” 456-57). 
As a result, Yonec grows up to be a young man who is both “brave” and 
“strong” as well as “generous” and “munificent” (461-62). Her legal hus-
band’s part in imparting this legacy is hinted to be minimal. Despite the fact 
that he is now kind to his wife and no longer imprisons her, this change of 
heart is a sham, only brought about by the magical intervention of Muldu-
marec. Thus, the responsibility and credit for proving Yonec’s lineage falls to 
his mother.
When Yonec comes of age, his mother introduces him to his 
father’s legacy and in the process confirms his position as the ruler of the 
fairy kingdom and Muldumarec’s avenger. Soon after Yonec is knighted, he 
and his mother travel with her husband to Caerlon (“Yonec” 467-68). His 
new knighthood is significant, as Burgess writes that in medieval culture 
the knighting ceremony would “have acted as a regenerative process in the 
boy’s life, marking his readiness for a new beginning” (72). Yonec’s new 
beginning takes place when his mother names him Muldumarec’s heir, and 
he must take on the responsibilities inherent to that position. On the way 
to Caerlon, the group becomes lost and, quite conveniently, stumbles upon 
Muldumarec’s tomb. Upon inquiry, they learn that the people of the land 
“have waited many days, / . . . for the son” of Muldumarec and his lover 
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(“Yonec” 522, 524). Yonec’s mother takes the opportunity to tell him about 
Muldumarec and how he was killed, revealing his true lineage and duties 
to him. Giving him Muldumarec’s sword, she collapses on her lover’s tomb 
and dies (539). When Yonec realizes that she is dead, he kills her husband 
and “with his father’s sword / he avenged his mother’s sorrow” (543-44). 
He is then proclaimed the “lord” of the land (550), a position his mother 
prepared him for morally and socially. “Yonec” complicates the customs of 
illegitimacy and maternal lineage found in “Milun” by conflating moral and 
social superiority, and by placing all of the power of legitimation under the 
control of the mother. Although this power does come at great psychologi-
cal and physical cost, it further empowers the figure of the mother and her 
illegitimate child, building on the social patterns governing illegitimacy in a 
way that is quite daring.
Marie’s manipulation of the politics of illegitimacy to empower the 
women of her lais reaches its height in “Le Fresne.” A deeply moving story 
of the rags-to-riches ascent of an abandoned child, the poem also dem-
onstrates the flexibility of bastardy as a social distinction and its possible 
effects on a child’s upbringing and prospects. The titular main character is 
born to legally married parents but, due to the ignorance and carelessness 
of her mother, is designated as illegitimate and abandoned immediately 
after birth. Fresne’s mother is married to a “brave and worthy” man (“Le 
Fresne” 6) whose best friend’s wife becomes pregnant before she does. The 
other woman gives birth to twin boys, and her delighted husband promises 
to send one to his friend to foster (17). Presumably jealous of the other 
woman’s good fortune, Fresne’s mother spitefully proclaims, “Both he and 
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she are disgraced by this,” announcing that a twin birth is impossible unless 
the woman has had “two men . . . with her” (36, 42). Her proclamation has 
devastating consequences. The other woman is imprisoned by her husband, 
while Fresne’s mother becomes the object of hatred for “[e]very woman” in 
the region (55). Moreover, when she becomes pregnant shortly afterwards, 
she herself delivers twin girls (70). Recognizing her mistake, she declares 
that she “condemned myself / when I slandered all womankind” (79-80). 
However, she nevertheless decides to hide her shame instead of admitting 
to her slander by abandoning one of the girls. Fresne’s origin story demon-
strates the fluidity of illegitimacy and how, in pre-modern times, a mother 
was the only one who could vouch for the legitimacy of her child. By 
abandoning Fresne, her mother marks her as illegitimate, despite her lawful 
birth. 
Robbed of a strong mother figure, Fresne must struggle throughout 
the lai to prove her status as a legitimate daughter on her own. Although 
this would at first seem quite different from the cases of Milun’s son and 
Yonec, a closer reading demonstrates how it builds on the same principles of 
maternal caring and lineage to constitute Marie’s most radical transforma-
tion of the politics of illegitimacy. As Michelle Freeman has pointed out, 
Fresne is protected and raised by “a community of sisters” (16). From the 
servant girl who leaves her at a convent (“Le Fresne”171-72), to the peasant 
woman who nurses her (206), to the abbess who “raise[s] the child herself ” 
(227), Fresne is surrounded by a network of women who look after and 
cherish her after her biological mother abandons her. She grows into “a 
beautiful” and “refined” young woman (237-38), who, as later events will 
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demonstrate, has inherited her foster mothers’ legacy of love and sacrifice. 
The maternal lineage that proved so crucial in the last two lais is undeni-
ably present in “Le Fresne” but in a revolutionary new form. Instead of 
one mother, she has many, and instead of a social position, they endow her 
with a moral one. While this reliance on moral superiority was developed 
at length in “Yonec,” “Le Fresne” takes it a step further. Yonec’s mother was 
able to pass on her lover’s prominent social position to her son along with 
her morality, and it is this conflation that marked Yonec as a legitimate son 
and heir. In contrast, Fresne’s mothers are only able to offer her their moral 
attributes, which, when unmoored from an influential social position, have 
little currency in a feudal society. As Sharon Kinoshita points out, “without 
an identifiable lineage, she is nothing more than a foundling with no value” 
(36). By choosing to characterize her heroine in this manner, Marie poses 
an issue that the rest of the lai investigates, asking whether the morality 
bequeathed to Fresne by her surrogate mothers will be enough to override 
her lack of social status and to overcome the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Fresne must leave the convent, and the security her abbess foster 
mother provides, when she is still quite young, forcing her to enact the 
sacrifice, kindness, and pragmatism that her mother figures would otherwise 
have provided. A young lord named Gurun falls in love with her beauty and 
by “plead[ing]” and “promis[ing] so much” (“Le Fresne” 273) convinces her 
to become his lover. Gurun is then unwilling to allow Fresne to remain in 
the relative safety of the convent, telling her that the abbess will surely be 
“upset” if Fresne falls “pregnant right under her roof” (282-83). He con-
vinces her to “come away” with him to his castle (286), promising never 
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to abandon her. By leaving the convent, Fresne enters into the “startlingly 
cynical” world of “the sexual politics of the feudal aristocracy” (Kinoshita 
34). In the eyes of Gurun’s vassals, her kind heart is of no consequence, and 
neither is the fact that they “love her for her noble character” (“Le Fresne” 
311). She is an impediment to the social order they are accustomed to and 
draws Gurun’s interest away from “having a child born in wedlock” (324) 
and bequeathing his property to that child. The political difficulty Fresne’s 
status poses is illustrated by the brutal metaphor Gurun’s vassals use to 
describe her. She is an “ash” that “bears no fruit” which Gurun must discard 
for another tree that “bears nuts and thus gives pleasure” (339-40). Fresne 
is a bare tree Gurun has no use for, as she has no political ties or powerful 
lineage to pass on, and any children she bears him will be unfit to inherit 
his land and position. As a result, his vassals insist that he abandon her for 
a fruitful, noble wife who will give birth to legitimate heirs. Caught in this 
hostile environment, Fresne must depend on herself, and must protect her 
interests in a sacrificial manner that has been characterized in the earlier lais 
as maternal. Despite the fact that she is “hidden away” from Gurun’s new 
bride, she “continue[s] to serve her lord well” (349, 353) and even shows 
kindness and care to his fiancée (380). Fresne’s decision to live humbly and 
uncomplainingly in the house of her former lover and his future wife not 
only demonstrates her practicality (after all, she has nowhere else to flee 
to); it also shows the kindness and self-sacrifice that has been coded in the 
other two lais as maternal, so much so that Gurun’s future mother-in-law 
comes to “love and admire” Fresne (384). In this manner, Fresne assumes 
the motherly role filled not only by her many foster mothers, but also by 
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Milun’s lover and Yonec’s mother. 
Painful as Fresne’s experiences may be, they prepare her to prove her 
position and claim her inheritance as a legitimate child. This development 
allows Fresne to bequeath her maternal moral lineage to herself and prove 
her own identity as a legitimate child worthy of an inheritance. In a twist of 
fate, Gurun’s bride-to-be is Fresne’s own twin sister, and his mother-in-law 
is the woman whose jealous declaration marked Fresne as a bastard and who 
abandoned her at birth. The key players are all in place for a triumphant 
reunion and reconciliation, but in this case it is Fresne who proves her 
position as a legitimate child, not her mother, and this proof is only made 
possible through the self-sacrifice inherited from her foster mothers. The 
night before the wedding, Fresne sets about arranging the couple’s bridal 
chamber and is disappointed with the quality of the cover laid out on the 
bed. She instead decides to replace it with “her birth garment” (“Le Fresne” 
403), the rich “embroidered silk robe” (123) she was found in as an infant. 
When Gurun’s mother-in-law sees the robe, she immediately recognizes it 
as the robe “she’d given / to her infant daughter when she abandoned her” 
(415-16). When questioned, Fresne is able to produce the ring that was also 
left with her, causing the penitent woman to declare “My dear, you are my 
daughter!” (450). Fresne’s sacrifice of her robe reveals her true nature as a 
legitimate child by prompting her mother’s confession and opens the way 
for her legal marriage to Gurun, which closes the lai. The fairy-tale quality 
of this ending masks the revolutionary claim Marie makes through Fresne. 
By stripping her of the support and love of a high-born mother that was 
crucial in the last two lais, she forces her protagonist to find the resources 
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for nurturance and goodness within herself and ends with an implicit 
declaration that these characteristics are enough to mark her as being nobly 
born and worthy of an advantageous marriage. Such a reading discounts the 
social hierarchy that mattered so deeply in “Milun” and “Yonec,” suggest-
ing that the true marker of legitimacy lies in the children themselves, not 
in their biological circumstances. However, it still locates this power firmly 
within the mother figure, as Fresne’s maternal lineage and motherly caring 
for her sister are what cause her to be recognized. 
When read together, “Milun,” “Yonec,” and “Le Fresne” reveal 
Marie’s transformation of medieval ideas about legitimacy and lineage into 
a network of motherly authority and power, which reaches the height of 
its development and progression in “Le Fresne.” At first, the overwhelming 
focus on power through marriage and motherhood may seem somewhat 
conventional. After all, Marie is locating female power precisely in the 
maternal roles that are most commonly used to oppress women, and one of 
her three heroines dies as a result of assuming that authority. However, the 
fact that Marie portrays female power as existing within, rather than outside 
of, societally accepted roles, provides a realistic depiction of the autonomy 
available to highborn medieval women, while still allowing her heroines to 
manipulate and question the validity of those same roles. This acknowledge-
ment of existing social structures presents a clear picture of the complex 
dynamics of the medieval patriarchy, while still paving the way for a more 
recognizable feminist literary tradition that would not emerge until centu-
ries later. 
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Reflecting Identity through Glass Windows in Charles Dickens’s Tom 
Tiddler’s Ground
Ryder Seamons
In Charles Dickens’s Christmas portmanteau story Tom Tid-dler’s Ground, Mr. Broadhead, a travelling artist, claims that “the windows of a house give one a great idea of the disposi-
tions, the habits, and the tempers of the occupants” (Collins 25). Windows 
appear in many different shapes and varieties throughout Tom Tiddler’s 
Ground, disclosing a concept of identity that is not definitive, but fragile 
and malleable. The framework for this portmanteau story—a nameless Trav-
eller visits a nameless county to seek out a hermit named Mr. Mopes—was 
created by Dickens and based partly on an autobiographical experience. Mr. 
Traveller attempts to convince Mr. Mopes to abandon his dreaded, solitary 
existence, and does so by inviting fellow passersby to share their stories of 
life from the outside world. 
Several regular contributors to Dickens’s periodicals wrote chapters 
for Tom Tiddler’s Ground: Charles Alston Collins writes Mr. Broadhead’s 
story of how he once observed a married couple’s unfortunate circumstance 
through a glass window in his London apartment; Amelia B. Edwards tells 
the tale of Francois Thierry, a passionate Frenchman who escapes prison 
after committing political offenses; Dickens’s close ally Wilkie Collins 
writes the story of two unrelated baby boys born on a ship at sea who are 
accidentally mixed up and remain indistinguishable due to a coincidental 
close resemblance; and the relatively unknown John Harwood provides 
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the unique narrative of a business man’s trek across continental America to 
retrieve his employer’s pocketbook. 
From the first page of the first story, characters interact with glass 
windows in noteworthy ways: they glance outward through windows, fix-
ated on distant landscapes from an interior dwelling; they glance through 
windows, observing the lifestyles of a home’s inhabitants from the outside; 
they climb in and out of windows, cover their windows with blinders, and 
smash the glass out of their window frames to replace them with bars. What 
does Dickens’s, and his fellow authors’, literary fixation on glass windows 
reveal to us about Tom Tiddler’s Ground?
Windows function in Tom Tiddler’s Ground both to reveal and to 
distort identity, suggesting that our sense of identity is not definitive nor vis-
ibly perceptible, but is malleable and easily mistaken. Utilizing windows as 
a literary motif, the authors draw a distinct dichotomy between individual 
identity, or one’s personality and unique attributes, and social identity, or 
one’s socioeconomic place in society, simultaneously implying that individu-
ality is of little worth and that, despite its superficiality, it is only one’s social 
identity that is necessary to flourish in modern society. 
Glass windows appear frequently in Dickens’s works, from the 
beginning of his career with Pickwick Papers, to Dickens’s final, unfinished 
novel, The Mystery of Edwin Drood. Katherine Williams, perhaps the lead-
ing expert on Dickens’s literary use of windows, argues that “Dickens was 
viscerally attracted to windows, and viscerally repulsed by their absence” 
(58). Dickens seemed to have a personal connection with windows that 
transcended his fiction. In the biography written by close confidante John 
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Forster, Dickens relates that during his darkest time working in a blacking 
house as a child, he was stationed by a window where “people,” including 
his father, “used to stop and look in” (67). Kristin Leonard argues that this 
sense of “display case captivity” produced by a glass window clearly pen-
etrates his novels, particularly in the case of Nell in The Old Curiosity Shop 
(208). Concerning this incident, Michael Hollington writes that, “when one 
recalls that Dickens as a child was taken away from Warren’s Blacking Ware-
house because his father was embarrassed by the fact that his son was visible 
as an ‘exhibit’ at work through the window . . . it is not difficult to under-
stand why so many meanings gathered for Dickens around glass thresholds 
between inside and outside” (11). Dickens’s writings in his own periodicals 
also reveal his fixation with windows. He “attacked” the infamous Window 
Tax in an article in Household Words, and later, after visiting a factory that 
made windows, published “Plate Glass,” an article detailing the techniques 
of glassmaking (Williams 56, Armstrong 20). Dickens often lamented the 
difficulty of organizing and editing his annual Christmas portmanteau sto-
ries into cohesive works with unifying themes and morals. It is clear, how-
ever, that the literary motif of glass windows appears so frequently in Tom 
Tiddler’s Ground and holds such significance to the development of plots 
and characters in the stories that it can hardly be considered coincidence.
The ways in which characters interact with glass windows suggest 
that identity  can be changed in an instant. In Edwards’ chapter “Picking 
Up Terrible Company,” a Frenchman named Francois Thierry shares his 
story of escaping from a French prison with Mr. Traveller and the hermit, 
Mr. Mopes. Thierry recounts that, upon arrival, he is given his prison uni-
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form, and on the trousers and blouse “were printed the fatal letters ‘T.F’” 
(Edwards 66). Thierry is then given a green cap, on the front of which is the 
number “207.” In an instant, Thierry’s name, the symbolic embodiment of 
his personal identity, is stripped and replaced by a prison number. “I was no 
longer Francois Thierry,” claims the Frenchman, “I was Number Two Hun-
dred and Seven,” implying that identity is not dictated by any inherited or 
definite means, but that one’s entire identity can be shifted and determined 
by anyone at any time (66). After a short and miserable stay in the cruel 
prison and an escape attempt, Francois finds himself stuck inside a confined 
room, with a locked door and “a tiny window close against the ceiling” 
(76). Hollington argues that “to be stationed at the window in Dickens” 
stands for “a longing for change and progress and the signs thereof” (3). The 
“tiny”-ness of the window symbolizes the relatively “tiny” chance for the 
Frenchman’s desires for freedom to come to fruition. He spends his time not 
looking out the window, but instead crawling through it. The Frenchman 
describes in great detail the grueling process of climbing up to the elevated 
glass window, and how he “drew [himself ] through the little casement, 
dropped as gently as [he] could upon the moist earth,” and made a safe 
escape, bringing about not only the “change” and “progress” he had hoped 
for, but also a change in identity (77).
The simple act of crawling out of a window results in Francois’s 
escape from prison, but also the termination of his identity as a prisoner, 
as quickly as it was given to him. He does not serve his time, nor does he 
show remorse or recompense for his political crimes. The transition through 
a window provides the Frenchman the means to escape confinement and 
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transforms his identity from a prisoner identified by a number to a free 
man identified by a name. It is important to note that Edwards draws a 
distinction between two different types of identity, as this theme continues 
throughout the other authors’ contributions to Tom Tiddler’s Ground as well. 
In addition to his individual identity, crawling through the window also 
alters the Frenchman’s social identity, due to the change from captive crimi-
nal to free man. When he later introduces himself to Mr. Traveller and Mr. 
Mopes, he proudly declares, “I am a Frenchman by birth, and my name is 
Francois Thierry” (Edwards 65). Francois’s physical interaction with a glass 
window transforms his identity, suggesting that both individual and social 
identities are not definitive but fragile, subject to change at any moment. 
The second chapter in Tom Tiddler’s Ground, by Charles Alston 
Collins, also uses windows to reinforce the idea that characters are defined 
by both an individual and a social identity, and suggests that identity is 
easily mistaken. The entire plot of this story, called “Picking Up Evening 
Shadows,” revolves around windows. The character sharing the story with 
Mr. Traveller and the hermit Mr. Mopes is Mr. Broadhead, who begins by 
stating that “the windows of a house give one a great idea of the disposi-
tions, the habits, and tempers of the occupants” (Collins 25). Mr. Broad-
head, an artist, tells of a time when he lived alone in a studio in London and 
how he observed a married couple who lived directly across the way. During 
the day, Mr. Broadhead could examine the empty interior of the couple’s 
residence through his window and theirs, but during the evening, when the 
window blinds were shut, Mr. Broadhead could analyze the actions and rou-
tines of the couple from the window of his own home by examining their 
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silhouettes. From observing the couple’s window, Mr. Broadhead accurately 
perceived much about their identity. His “tendency to attach much impor-
tance to the external aspects of things as indicative of what goes on within” 
led him to surmise that the couple lived in poverty, but “little contrivances 
and adornments there were about this poor casement, which, though of 
the cheapest and most twopenny order of decorative art, showed yet some 
love of the gentler side of things, and a wish to put a good face on poverty” 
(Collins 25, 26). Again, like the Frenchman, this glass window reveals to the 
narrator and the reader both the individual and social identity of the couple. 
Their low social class is manifest, but fashionable decorative taste speaks to 
Mr. Broadhead of the individual identities of the couple that seemingly dif-
fer from their class status. 
The “mistaken pair” is a literary trope that appears often in 
Dickens’s fiction, and it is through the glass window that Mr. Broadhead 
confuses one married couple for another, again suggesting that identity 
is not always visibly perceptible, but can be easily mistaken. After observ-
ing through shadows that the husband was ill and could no longer provide 
financial support, Mr. Broadhead began anonymously donating money to 
aid the couple in their struggle, only to find later that he had mistaken the 
silhouetted couple in the window for another married couple living next 
door who were suffering from an identical misfortune and benefited from 
the anonymous donations. If two individuals or groups of individuals can 
appear to be so similar by appearance or circumstance as to have their iden-
tities completely mistaken by those who are familiar with them, the authors 
of Tom Tiddler’s Ground here suggest that individual identity fails to perform 
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its sole duty of distinguishing individuals from one another. In the case of 
the couple, the window functions paradoxically by revealing accurately to 
Mr. Broadhead information about the couple’s individual identity and social 
class, while simultaneously causing him to mistake the couple for their next-
door neighbors. The window both reveals and distorts identity, implying 
that identity is fickle and easily mistaken.
The glass window functions in a similarly paradoxical manner as 
it reveals to the reader the identity of Mr. Broadhead himself, the narra-
tor of the story. In his case, the function of glass windows seems to comply 
with Leonard’s theory that windows create “physical and societal confine-
ment”; however, the windows simultaneously provide Mr. Broadhead with 
an opportunity for sociality as he comes to know his neighbors by means of 
observation through a window (209). Mr. Broadhead repeatedly confesses 
that it was the loneliness and isolation he felt living by himself in London 
that fueled his obsession with the married couple in the window across the 
way. To the hermit, Mr. Broadhead warns, “I never knew any good to come 
yet. . . of a man shutting himself up the way you’re doing” (Collins 22). The 
glass window confines Mr. Broadhead to a solitary lifestyle, and perhaps 
even temporarily intensifies his loneliness by giving him a glimpse of social 
domestic life but denying him the experience of being able to engage in 
such a life. Williams suggests that two of the literary functions of windows 
are “to frame an outside world that is seen and analyzed from an interior” 
and “to frame an interior space that is seen and analyzed from the outside,” 
both of which occur in this story (59). This two-window separation cre-
ates the illusion that sociality is present, but only through the passive act of 
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observation that the windows provide. This is the “display case captivity” 
that Leonard refers to in her argument on The Old Curiosity Shop. As Mr. 
Broadhead himself admits, “it would be difficult to express how anxiously I 
longed for the evening, and the shadows which should tell me more” (Col-
lins 28). 
The window that confines and restricts reveals Mr. Broadhead’s 
identity as one who is completely alone in terms of friends or family, but 
later shows Mr. Broadhead’s transformed identity as one no longer defined 
by isolation. Mr. Broadhead eventually introduces himself to the shadow-
couple and admits that he intended to donate financially to assist them after 
learning of their circumstances through his window, then returns home. 
Mr. Broadhead sat for an hour, “reflecting on the loneliness of my own 
position,” when he heard his name shouted from a window across the way, 
discovering that the couple of his obsession was inviting him to join them 
for the evening (Collins 61). Ultimately, Mr. Broadhead’s observations from 
his confined window space provides for a different identity, defined not 
by isolation but instead by sociality. Eventually, his interactions with glass 
windows did not perpetuate his identity as a man “leading a solitary life,” 
but instead the glass windows, which originally provided only confinement 
and restriction, allowed for a social life and a new identity as a man no 
longer living in complete isolation (22). Again, windows function paradoxi-
cally both to reveal and to distort identity, implying the malleability of one’s 
identity. 
While identity proves to be fragile, malleable, and easily mistaken 
in Tom Tiddler’s Ground, the authors also suggest that different parts of 
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identity prove to be more significant than others. Dickens’s own framework 
chapter distinguishes between individual identity and social identity by 
describing the village and its windows, proposing that individual identity is 
of little worth and that social status is the preferred method of identification 
in Victorian society. Dickens describes in detail the idyllic farmland “among 
the pleasant dales and trout-streams of a green English county,” but then 
adds, “no matter what county” (3). Dickens neglects to provide a proper 
name that might separate the village from any other and give it a distinct 
sense of individual identity. According to one critic, the setting of Tom Tid-
dler’s Ground is “framed by an image of a village that is less truly particular 
than nationally representative” (Piesse 49). Dickens almost lazily remarks 
that “the village street was like most other village streets: wide for its height, 
silent for its size, and drowsy in the dullest degree,” further implying the 
idea that individuality is of little importance (3). 
Dickens does, however, provide the village with a developed social 
identity, and he does so by describing the glass windows of certain build-
ings. The “largest of window-shutters” of the “Doctor’s house. . . stood as 
conspicuous and different as the Doctor himself in his broadcloth, among 
the smockfrocks of his patients” (Dickens 4). Though the Doctor apparently 
merits some form of introduction, he never makes an appearance in the 
story—only his window does. Dickens isn’t using the window to describe a 
person; he is using the window to describe an occupation of a character who 
isn’t even present. Further down the street, “some of the small tradesmen’s 
houses. . . had a Cyclops window in the middle of the gable . . . suggesting 
that some forlorn rural Prentice must wriggle himself into that apartment 
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horizontally” (5). Again, Dickens’s description of the tradespeople provides 
no individual detail of the humans occupying these professions—the reader 
only knows that their rank in the business is “Prentice.” Dickens’s descrip-
tion of a “Cyclops window” further intimates the anonymity of the village. 
The social identity of the village is the main focus, as opposed to any unique 
detail about the actual people living there that might provide the village 
with a distinct flavor. Dickens describes what appears to be a ghost town, 
where glass windows reveal information about occupations filled by myste-
riously absent villagers. All of these details suggest that in the modernized 
Victorian society of Tom Tiddler’s Ground, one’s identity is shaped by titles, 
occupations, and class, not by any originality or individualism. 
The intentional lack of proper names continues with several of the 
characters in the framework story, implying that one’s individual identity 
is less notable than status or title. The names given to characters in Dick-
ens’s fiction are a curious phenomenon that have received much attention 
from scholars and critics. Some names are full of deeper implications for a 
character’s identity, while other names seem to play a purely comic function. 
The first three characters introduced in the first chapter of Tom Tiddler’s 
Ground are referred to only as the Landlord, the Tinker, and the Traveller, 
or Mr. Traveller, the protagonist. Dickens, who is known to put much effort 
into concocting clever names for even the most insignificant characters, 
surely has a purpose in neglecting to give his main character a proper name. 
The hermit, whose lowly and pitiful existence becomes the central feature 
around which the plot of the entire portmanteau story revolves, is given a 
name, and is referred to as Mr. Mopes. One could argue that having a given 
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name makes Mr. Mopes, despite his position as the piece’s antagonist, supe-
rior to Mr. Traveller in terms of a developed individual identity. Without 
a proper name, Mr. Traveller lacks the depth of individuality that belongs 
to Mr. Mopes. Further, Mr. Mopes is described as having many other traits 
that accentuate his individuality, perhaps even more so than Mr. Traveller. 
The hermit Mr. Mopes speaks “with an air of authority” as one “who has 
been to school,” has a distinctively fierce and rugged personality type, and 
he is referred to as a “genius,” “an Emperor,” and “a Conqueror” (Dickens 
12, 8, 7, 7). Such personal distinction is given only to Mr. Mopes, and the 
author neglects to develop even slightly the individuality of Mr. Traveller. 
However, Dickens seems to be less interested in the difference in depth of 
individuality, as he puts a greater emphasis on the social identities of these 
two characters. 
There is a clear disparity drawn between the socioeconomic cir-
cumstances of Mr. Traveller and Mr. Mopes, in which individuality plays 
no part. Though no occupation or social ranking is given to Mr. Traveller, 
it is apparent that he has a comfortable place in society, whereas Mr. Mopes 
is alienated and marginalized. Although Mr. Mopes has a more distinct 
individual identity, without a developed social identity he is nothing more 
than a “Nuisance” (Dickens 16). Mr. Traveller, politely but sternly, says to 
Mr. Mopes, “you are a Nuisance, and this kennel is a Nuisance . . . and the 
Nuisance is not merely a local Nuisance, because it is a general Nuisance 
to know that there can be such a Nuisance left in civilization so very long 
after its time” (16). Mr. Traveller admits that, in previous eras, hermits were 
romanticized for their eccentricity, cultivated by a life in isolation. However, 
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it is implied here that the age of “individual identity” has passed, and mod-
ern civilization values only those with a developed social identity. Unlike in 
the past, high status overshadows individual uniqueness. 
Lastly, a critical examination of the windows belonging to both 
Landlord and Mr. Mopes further establishes the different social and indi-
vidual identities of Landlord, who is identified purely by his socio-economic 
status, and Mr. Mopes, who is purely identified by his eccentric individual-
ity, ultimately implying that a stable position in society far outweighs any 
sense of personal identity. Of all the features of Mr. Mopes’s residence, his 
windows are the first things described. As stated before, a visitor to Mr. 
Mopes’s residence said that windows “give one a great idea of the disposi-
tions, the habits, and the tempers of the occupants,” both in preface to his 
own story but also perhaps as a subtle observation of Mr. Mopes himself, 
or what could be supposed of his nature from simply beholding his win-
dows (Collins 25). In describing the windows, Dickens remarks that “all 
the window-glass. . . had been abolished by the surprising genius of Mopes” 
(Dickens 7, 8). Glass equips the window with much of its poetic capacity; 
without glass, a window is nothing but an empty frame. The glass is what 
both reveals and distorts, providing readers with insight into the complex 
identities of the characters that interact with the window but also adding 
nuance to that which may seem ordinary. Armstrong believes that “the 
[Victorian] novel is founded on glass culture,” and that, “for the [Victorian] 
novel, the glass panel of a window is the single most important architectural 
form” (183). 
Not only is the glass removed from the hermit’s window-frames, 
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but “all the windows . . . were barred across with rough split logs of trees 
nailed over them” (Dickens 8). Mr. Mopes’s intentional removal of glass 
from his window and the barring of the window-frames suggests an unwill-
ingness to provide outsiders with a transparent insight into his own life. 
Further, he refuses to exist in the “display case captivity” that windows so 
often create for their characters, keeping his individual identity concealed 
(Leonard 208). His individual identity, far from the transparent and bland 
ones of Traveller and Landlord, is complex and difficult to navigate, for both 
the characters within the novel and readers. Though it is evident from his 
distinct personality traits and his proper name that Mr. Mopes has a fully-
developed individual identity, it provides him with no substantial advan-
tages and is considered purely a “Nuisance,” just as a window-frame without 
glass could be considered a nuisance (Dickens 16). 
A barred-up window intimates an equally barred-up individual—
Mr. Mopes does not share his developed individual identity with outsiders. 
The barred window also reveals information about the hermit’s close-to-
nonexistent social identity. Hollington theorizes that glass windows indi-
cate a “longing for change and progress and the signs thereof that might 
be detected on the horizon” (3). By barring his windows with rough logs, 
however, Mopes symbolically removes any hopes of a promising future. His 
disregard for possible future prospects perpetuates his lowly lifestyle and 
prevents any change from actually occurring. His peculiar reputation (one 
that tends to attract bad company) is the only thing that maintains his place 
in the town’s socioeconomic order, and at the lowest possible rung. Dickens, 
along with his equally disapproving literary persona Mr. Traveller, suggests 
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that in a modernized society with an increasing distinction growing between 
classes, individuality plays no valuable role. It is solely social identity that 
allows one to flourish, or even exist, in society with dignity. Mopes’s true 
sin is not his improper lifestyle or individual identity, but his refusal to take 
even the smallest steps towards developing a sense of sociality or enterprise. 
The Landlord’s window poses as the obvious antithesis to Mopes’s 
window, revealing his promising social prospects, but also the overall 
superficiality of his identity. The first scene of Dickens’s framework story, 
“Picking Up Soot and Cinders,” shows a simple conversation between the 
Traveller, eating his breakfast, and the Landlord, stationed at the table near 
the window. Armstrong writes that the “isolated figure at the window” is the 
“endemic image of nineteenth century iconography” (33). For the course 
of the entire conversation, the Landlord engages in his “favorite action” of 
looking out the window (Dickens 2). Unlike Mopes’s window, the Land-
lord’s is clean and transparent, with the window-blind drawn down half-
way. If Mopes’s barred window indicates an individual with no social stand-
ing or prospects, the Landlord’s glass window clearly indicates a comfortable 
status. However, the Landlord looks out the window not on an expansive 
landscape of charming domestic-life or greenery, but “at vacancy” (1). To 
consider the nature of glass windows is to realize that they “set up a dialogue 
between translucency and reflection” (Armstrong 140). In other words, 
windows not only show what lies beyond restrictive walls, but also the faint 
reflection of one’s own likeness staring back. Landlord’s gaze “at vacancy” 
was not one directed toward a vacant setting or countryside, but a “vacant” 
reflection staring back at him. This is apparent when Dickens writes that the 
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blinds were “half drawn down,” and yet Landlord “stooped a little.” Surely a 
pleasant landscape could have been seen even if the blinds were drawn down 
slightly, but Dickens later reiterates that the Landlord “stooped again, to get 
a more comprehensive view of vacancy under the window-blind” (Dickens 
2). 
The apparent “vacancy” of the Landlord’s reflective image applies 
both to his individual and social identity. It is evident that, without a proper 
name, history, or any distinguishable traits or unique features, the “vacancy” 
of the Landlord’s individual identity suggests that it is simply nonexistent. 
Social identity is present, however—it is clear even from his title-name that 
the Landlord exists comfortably and has a well-developed social identity. 
The “vacancy” in this sense, then, refers to the superficiality of the Land-
lord’s personal identity. Like the reflection one sees while looking at a 
window, the Landlord’s identity exists, but it is faint and translucent; the 
silhouette is present but there are no distinctive features that provide flavor 
or substance. While it is evident that Dickens disapproves of the hermit 
Mr. Mopes’s lifestyle, he does imply that an identity established solely on 
social and economic status, though necessary to flourish in society, is indeed 
superficial. 
By depicting character interactions with glass windows, the authors 
of Tom Tiddler’s Ground add nuance to the concept of identity, imply-
ing that it is not definitive or inherited, but fragile, malleable, and easily 
mistaken. Utilizing windows as a literary motif, as well as employing other 
literary techniques such as the omission of proper names, the authors also 
divide individual identity and social identity, suggesting that individual-
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ity serves little purpose in a modernized society focused on economy, class, 
and status, and that social identity is essential for socio-economic success. 
However, despite its importance in society, Dickens and his cohorts subtly 
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The Earth and the Portrait: A Comparison of Dostoevsky’s  
Alyosha Karamazov and Prince Myshkin
Callaghan McDonough
In his major novels, Fyodor Dostoevsky sought to manifest the consequences of certain ideologies—mainly Christianity and atheism—in narrative form. In 1868, Dostoevsky published 
The Idiot, with the intent of “[depicting] the positively good man,” a sort 
of perfect imitation of Christ incarnated in modern Russian society (qtd. 
in Knapp 154). As his writing progressed, Dostoevsky soon discovered—in 
Myshkin’s ultimate moral failure—that “there is nothing more difficult than 
[this pursuit] in the world, especially nowadays” (154). Dostoevsky felt 
that he had not expressed “even a tenth” of what he had intended (qtd. in 
Miller 22). Twelve years later, Dostoevsky published his magnum opus, The 
Brothers Karamazov, partly as a second attempt at creating a “positively good 
man” in the character of Alyosha. This time he succeeded; Alyosha became 
what Myshkin failed to be. 
But it can be difficult to see why. How is it that of these two men, 
each with the loftiest of intentions and each confronting the same world of 
suffering, Alyosha’s story ends in a spiritual victory, while Myshkin’s ends 
in spiritual squalor? A close analysis reveals that Alyosha embraces reality 
and becomes a triumphant Christ figure, rising figuratively above death. In 
contrast, Myshkin pursues an artistic reflection of reality and never exits the 
tomb.
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I. The First Crossroads: The Inner Person 
In Dostoevsky’s imaginative world, the narrative Christ figure must 
confront evil. When any author constructs a Christ figure, equally powerful 
forces of antagonism must also be introduced. For just as the biblical Christ 
goes to war against evil and death, so must imitations of Christ battle imita-
tions of these same enemies. In both The Brothers Karamazov and The Idiot, 
Alyosha and Myshkin wrestle with grim manifestations of evil; first, howev-
er, they struggle in the abstract. Having just emerged from relative isolation, 
Alyosha and Myshkin enter society and are forced to engage the philosophi-
cal problem of evil. This intellectual challenge foreshadows what is to come 
in embodied form. For each character’s response to abstract suffering reveals 
the manner in which each will later engage actual suffering. 
In The Brothers Karamazov, Alyosha’s brother Ivan provides the 
most explicit atheistic perspective in the novel, and his argument for athe-
ism—in the form of the problem of evil—acts as an abstract antagonist to 
Alyosha’s faith. In its basic form, the problem of evil posits that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being cannot coexist with evil. Evil clearly 
exists; therefore, God does not exist. Ivan Karamazov’s formulation of this 
argument is addressed in the following question:
Imagine that you yourself are building the edifice of 
human destiny with the goal of making people happy in 
the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but for that 
it was necessary and unavoidable to torture just one tiny 
little creation, [a] little child who [is] beating herself on 
the chest with her little fist, and found this edifice on 
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her unavenged tears, would you agree to be the architect 
under such conditions…? (213)
In other words, a loving God would not create a world in which even one 
child is tortured and killed, regardless of any further ends to be accom-
plished. If God does exist, Ivan argues, he has created a world of suffer-
ing that can never be truly “redeemed,” for no amount of vengeance, hell, 
forgiveness, or even future happiness can blot out the earthly suffering of 
children, who endure agony for the sake of their irresponsible Creator’s plan 
(212). This irresponsible Creator—whether or not he exists—is a being 
unworthy of worship. Ivan’s visceral and intellectually thorough “rebellion” 
(204)—of which this episode is only a segment—was, in Dostoevsky’s own 
words, a more “powerful…expression of…ideas from the atheistic point of 
view” than any ever seen in Europe (Notebooks, qtd. in The Brothers Karama-
zov 667). Much of its power comes from the fact that Dostoevsky construct-
ed his case for atheism using actual historical accounts of child abuse from 
trials he had read about and attended, producing an effect that has struck 
many as being potent enough to topple any defense of the divine (209). 
Alyosha’s response, however—delivered immediately—suggests that 
there is a theodicy that can withstand Ivan’s intellectual arsenal: “You said 
just now, is there a being in the whole world who would have the right to 
forgive and could forgive? But there is a Being and He can forgive every-
thing, all and for all, because He gave His innocent blood for all and every-
thing” (Brothers 213). Whether or not this is a sufficient response to Ivan is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but Alyosha’s offering of this response reveals 
something fundamental about his character. As he is intimately acquainted 
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with sickness and poverty by this point, Alyosha possesses a raw understand-
ing of the problem of evil. For him, the problem of evil is not simply an 
idea, a conflict confined to the mind; it is far more holistic. For this reason, 
Alyosha points to Christ, understanding him as a being—a living, incarnate 
person. Furthermore, rather than focusing upon Christ’s teaching, Alyosha 
focuses upon Christ’s life and death upon the cross. While on earth, Christ 
was one who cradled lepers, wept with the mourning, and ultimately under-
went crucifixion; he knew suffering and resurrection. Following his redemp-
tive sacrifice for humankind, Christ promised to be as spiritually present in 
humankind’s pain as he was while on earth. As Ivan draws his theoretical 
argument from historical accounts of suffering, Alyosha responds with what 
he believes to be a historical account of healing, one that continues to be 
present. Unlike an abstract theodicy, Alyosha’s “Being” is a living person, 
active amidst suffering and responsive to the needs of the weeping child. For 
Alyosha, suffering is not something that can be explained away with a the-
odicy; it must be tangibly alleviated through human action. This incarnate 
response stands in contrast to an abstract reflection of existence. As such, 
whether or not Alyosha provides an adequate response to the problem of 
evil, his human response reveals the direction he himself has chosen. 
In The Idiot, the problem of evil arrives through a different medi-
um, that of Hans Holbein’s painting, The Body of the Dead Christ in the 
Tomb. Ippolit Terentyev, who fills Ivan Karamazov’s role as an advocate of 
atheism, describes the painting’s emaciated, scarred Christ, his pallor grey, 
his empty eyes rolling back into his head, saying that “one has the impres-
sion of nature as some enormous, implacable, dumb beast,” a “vast modern 
48 MCDONOUGH 
machine which has pointlessly seized, dismembered, and devoured, in its 
blind and insensible fashion, a great and priceless being, a being worth all of 
nature and all her laws” (430). In his art criticism, Ippolit voices the athe-
ist response to evil; this argument acts an abstract antagonist to Myshkin’s 
faith. Unlike Ivan’s rebellion, Ippolit rejects God not because of the absurd 
foundation of humankind’s ultimate harmony, but because of the absurd 
reality of its ultimate destruction. A nail entering the wrist of an inno-
cent man is definitive and purely physical; no space exists in the painting’s 
frame for an omni-benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent Artist. In Ippolit’s 
interpretation, Holbein depicts Christ’s death as senseless, thoughtless, and 
impersonal. When a person’s life ends—particularly in a horrific manner—
this defies any possibility of an all-good, all-powerful God and any possibil-
ity of resurrection for humankind. In the overwhelming presence of death, 
it seems impossible that God is able—or even desires—to continue human-
kind’s existence beyond this earth. Therefore, the Artist of this life must be 
indifferent Nature alone. Death, not God, splashes the final black hue of 
paint. Christ remains in the tomb. 
While Alyosha presents a response to Ivan, Myshkin mutely faces 
Ippolit’s challenge. Indeed, in his own examination of Holbein’s painting, 
his only comment is, “A man could lose his faith looking at that picture!” 
(Idiot 229). In Platonic terms, while Ivan’s formulation of the problem of 
evil—being based on historical accounts—is once-removed from reality, 
Ippolit’s formulation results from a painting and is thus twice-removed from 
reality. Thus, when Myshkin engages suffering here, he is—epistemologi-
cally—a lengthy distance away from real suffering. Alyosha is much closer, 
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yet he evinces no fear of “[losing] his faith.” How can a mere image dispel 
a man’s core beliefs? This question becomes more pressing as one observes 
Myshkin’s frequent and exuberant assertions of commitment to Orthodox 
Christianity (231, 574-5). In these moments, Myshkin appears to staunchly 
hold his beliefs to the point of dogmatism. However, when asked directly 
about his personal faith, Myshkin is evasive (229, 402). Why can Myshkin 
pontificate about Christianity one moment, but cannot provide a defense 
when his beliefs are challenged? How can his dogmatic faith be undermined 
by paint on a canvas? 
When one more closely analyzes Myshkin’s orations, the answer 
becomes evident. Myshkin speaks of the “concept of God,” the “idea of 
Christ,” “Our Christ” (Idiot 231, 575). He presents Christ as an idea (a 
specifically “Russian” idea), an image, a word that can be spoken, or a ban-
ner that one waves above one’s troops. While Alyosha portrays Christ as a 
three-dimensional, living “Being” who can be personally known, Myshkin 
provides no evidence of belief in an actual God; he sees a two-dimensional 
image of Christ (213). For this reason, Holbein’s painting is enough to 
topple his faith; an image displaces an image. Why is this the case? Just as 
Myshkin’s cherished beliefs are two-dimensional, so is his inner existence; 
he lacks the kind of experiential self-knowledge required for spiritual depth. 
Thus, when confronted by questions of his own being, he possesses no 
response. These questions concern his reality, and Myshkin’s mind—freshly 
removed from a Swiss asylum—is still dwelling in the abstract. Unlike 
Alyosha, who—in response to Ivan—moves from abstract ideas to the gritty 
reality of the world, specifically in his complex family relations, Myshkin’s 
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mind remains fixated upon an imagined, artistic reflection of the world. 
These internal changes—or lack thereof—provide the first inklings of each 
man’s approaching fate.   
II. The Second Crossroads: The Other 
The next major crossroads for each protagonist concerns the Other. 
Each has begun to choose how he will conceptually view the world; now, 
each must decide how he will view other people—specifically, certain beau-
tiful women in his life. Alyosha’s and Myshkin’s interactions with particular 
women provide the clearest glimpse into their moral characters, revealing 
their incarnate solidity or “excarnate” vacuity (cf. Taylor 556).
Alyosha’s father and brothers, in describing the woman Grushen-
ka—for whom they romantically compete—fashion a glamorized caricature. 
She becomes a kind of sexualized goddess in the imagination of young Alyo-
sha. Continuing the destructive family pattern, Alyosha willfully resolves 
to wield her as a weapon in his own rebellion against God, following the 
death of Father Zosima, Alyosha’s mentor. With Grushenka—in a black silk 
dress—“nestling” like a “kitten” on his lap, Alyosha’s glossy imaginings have 
come to life (300). The Karamazov (“black smear”) has awoken within Alyo-
sha, and he plans to indulge it, succumbing to the image. In other words, 
Alyosha plans to engage in a sexual act with Grushenka, but one that defies 
recognition of the act’s self-giving, other-honoring element; it is intended to 
be angry, egocentric, and degrading.
But in this “critical moment,” Alyosha allows his expectations to 
be upended by reality and, as a result, he comes to a deeper understanding 
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of the Other (Brothers 291, cf. Weil 65). Faced with the actual embodied 
person of Grushenka, Alyosha discerns her kindness and cannot commit 
the act that his father would; the surname’s dominion is limited, and the 
“Alyosha” (“defender of man”) has risen in defense. For the woman before 
him is exactly that—a woman!—a three-dimensional human person with 
her own hopes, fears, insecurities, and imperfections. She is not a possession 
or a conquest or a painting, but a “treasure” (302). The curtain of lust and 
prejudice is thus torn in two, and Alyosha perceives a “sister” sitting on his 
knee (305).
In perceiving the reality of another—a selfless pursuit of under-
standing—Alyosha draws Grushenka into his manner of seeing. In her 
designs, he, too, had been a conquest—a projection of judgmental purity to 
be defiled (Brothers 301). Alyosha was to be her rebellion, not against God, 
but against the other Karamazov men, who seek to control her, and Alyosha, 
who she believes has judged her (304). 
But Alyosha’s attention prompts reciprocation. Her remorse 
upon learning of Zosima’s death, followed by her leaping from his knee in 
shame, displays authenticity, not manipulation. Something remarkable has 
occurred, and it is a turning point for both characters, but especially for 
Alyosha. With the subsequent forming of a relationship—the two becom-
ing siblings in suffering—each is drawn from their shadowy projections into 
a very earthbound intimacy. In becoming proximate to each other—and 
truly attending to each other—object becomes person, and person becomes 
family. Alyosha has learned to move from abstraction to reality, appearance 
to being. In his previous fear of evil, Alyosha had hidden behind monastery 
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walls; now he emerges from within the monastery of his own mind. He 
expected to find “treasure” only in those like Zosima: the “saints” (Brothers 
302). In his interaction with Grushenka, however, he learns that beauty and 
goodness can be found even in one who shoulders the societal yoke of “sin-
ner.” Alyosha discovers that when he embraces others’ embodied realities—
in this case, quite literally—he may find the joy of a mutually-redeeming 
relationship. 
But where Alyosha succeeds, Myshkin fails. As Myshkin becomes 
further entrenched in Russian society, the face of Christ is not the only 
image vying for his devotion. He is also confronted by the portrait of the 
breathtaking Nastasya. Myshkin’s strange, impulsive response to his first 
viewing of this image—the kiss—cannot be over-emphasized (Idiot 85). 
In Myshkin’s kiss on the canvas, he pledges himself to the fictional image. 
Why does Myshkin kiss the portrait but gaze in stupefaction at the actual 
woman? The answer is simple: for Myshkin, the portrait is—in almost every 
sense—the woman. Myshkin’s enraptured gaze rests on a two-dimensional 
projection. 
Indeed, Myshkin—“afraid to look at [women]”—never truly does 
(Idiot 82). Throughout the novel, Nastasya’s actual behavior conflicts with 
the beauty of her portrait, and Myshkin is unable to reconcile the difference 
(124). Seeing a created image, he imposes this created image on the actual 
person. As a result, Myshkin is voluntarily blind to Nastasya’s reality. “In 
you everything is perfection…no one would wish to see you different,” he 
tells her, a statement that—while flattering—is far from the truth (148). 
Nastasya is not the only victim of Myshkin’s blindness. Aglaya, too, is one 
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wondrous “portrait” that he sees “as an object a mile away from where he is” 
(364). Existing at a permanent distance from the knowledge of Aglaya’s and 
Nastasya’s actual natures—their intricacies, flaws, and desires—Myshkin 
objectifies and idealizes them. Unlike Alyosha, who develops a proxi-
mate and physical connection to a fully-realized, flesh-and-blood woman, 
Myshkin sees women as installations in an art gallery. 
Myshkin’s inability to see women as persons is ultimately the result 
of fear. As Myshkin says, he is afraid to look at Aglaya’s face (Idiot 82), and 
he says, “I cannot bear Nastasya Filippovna’s face…I’m afraid of her face!” 
(616-7). He much prefers to gaze upon the women’s portraits than to meet 
their eyes, as he fears the intimacy of an actual relationship. For this reason, 
he objectifies Nastasya and Aglaya, seeing them as portraits even when he is 
with them. He would prefer not to discover their imperfections through a 
relationship; rather, if they can remain “stopping points,” colorful idols with 
a manufactured façade of perfection, he can continue to worship them—
from a safe distance (Marion 10-11). Just as he replaced Christ with an 
image, so he does with women. 
For this is Myshkin’s desire: to worship his idea of each woman, or 
more specifically, each woman’s beauty. Myshkin is profoundly moved by 
beauty; it has the power of salvation over him (Idiot 402). Rowan Williams 
calls Myshkin a “man with no history” (51). Myshkin does possess a history, 
however; it is simply a history of alienation. In Russian society, he remains 
as much an “outcast” from the “chorus” of life as he was in the Swiss asy-
lum; thus, he is seeking an entry point into the world (Idiot 446). “Beauty” 
becomes this entry point. But when Myshkin sees Nastasya or Aglaya, he 
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experiences a feeling, and he calls this “beauty.” When he pursues beauty, he 
is—in actuality—pursuing the feeling that results from seeing the woman; 
he is not pursuing the woman herself. As a result, he loves like a “disembod-
ied spirit,” a ghost worshiping a mirage (617). He can kiss Nastasya’s two-
dimensional portrait—and later, Aglaya’s love letter—but never the three-
dimensional woman (85, 380). Each kiss is an attempt to be swallowed up 
by beauty, to achieve a “profound experience of infinite happiness” (238). 
But what he truly needs and desires is an intimate relationship. While Alyo-
sha is willing to be “spiritually completed by others” through a relationship 
(Wyman 177), Myshkin is indecisive, unable to commit to either Aglaya or 
Nastasya; he tells Yevgeni Pavlovich that he wants to love them both (Idiot 
617). Both women are tortured by this lack of commitment. Myshkin, how-
ever, does not recognize his fault, for how does one commit to a picture? 
As before, Myshkin is longing to escape his dreamlike reality, but he 
continues to doggedly chase dreams. He longs to be “saved by beauty,” but 
his beauty is not salvific or an antidote to alienation (Idiot 402). Perceiving 
human beings as pictures imprisons him in a kind of solipsism, surrounded 
by moving images crossing the retina. At this point in our analysis, this is 
Myshkin’s fate. Coming into St. Petersburg, he says, “I have no experience 
of women at all” (14). After months in Russia, he still has none. 
III. The Final Crossroads: Engaging the World
Thus far, we have analyzed two crossroads on Myshkin’s and 
Alyosha’s respective paths—paths leading toward their contrasting fates. We 
have seen how each man views his world and how each views other specific 
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individuals in his life. In reality, these have been paths to potential incar-
nation. As Christ was to become actually incarnate in the world, so each 
Christ figure is to become incarnate in Dostoevsky’s narrative world. At each 
crossroads, the underlying question has been: will each Christ figure move 
toward becoming incarnate in his narrative world? Will each see the reality 
of suffering not only abstractly but also in embodied persons? 
Now, we arrive at the final crossroads on this path to incarnation. 
Will Alyosha and Myshkin fully enter the world? Possessing a view of reality, 
will they now engage in that reality? The previous crossroads focused upon 
each man’s perceptions; here we focus on their actions. We have seen the 
beginnings of each man’s interactions with others, Alyosha’s being more pos-
itive than Myshkin’s. However, at this third crossroads, each man ultimately 
decides who he will become—a man of action, or a man of dreams. 
The monastery garden is the site of Alyosha’s successful incarnation 
as a Christ figure. In Grushenka, Alyosha has glimpsed reality through the 
forging of a deep relationship. However, in her reality he has also witnessed 
pain. Upon his return to the monastery, we can understand Alyosha as 
confronting the question that has dominated his life since his return to Sko-
toprigonevsk. He has chosen the monastic path partly as a desire to escape 
from suffering; now, he must ask himself whether his entire life will be one 
of comfortable isolation. Father Païssy’s juxtaposed reading reveals that 
Christ’s first miracle occurred in Cana of Galilee; there, Christ had to decide 
whether it was time to make himself known to society and enter public life. 
Alyosha, perhaps, realizes that he, too, faces this choice. Clear, pure water is 
life-giving, but Christ chose to transform it into the more worldly and rich-
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er wine, which brought gladness to the world. Will Alyosha do the same? 
Alyosha’s dream represents a temporary relapse into a state of safe 
unconsciousness, yet even there, reality beckons in the form of a vision to 
which Alyosha responds. The stars offer him a future of contemplation. 
Casting aside that hope, however, Alyosha chooses instead to embrace the 
earth. He even kisses the soil—earthy actuality (not a painted portrait). 
Alyosha knows that with this embrace will come suffering; he weeps over 
the earth, and all who are in it, for he loves them. Yet in embracing the 
finite, he has also received the ecstasy of the infinite; the “vault of heaven” 
has entered his soul (Brothers 312). Like a Kierkegaardian knight of faith, 
he “makes the movement of infinity and [gets] finitude out of it;” he lowers 
his eyes from the skies in order to express the “sublime in the pedestrian” 
(Kierkegaard 70). Here, Alyosha has embraced the real and received the 
exaltation of dreams. Thus, when he rises up and leaves the monastery—
reflecting his dream of the risen Christ—he does so as a “resolute champion” 
(Brothers 312). A champion over his previous fear and voluntary blindness, 
he has indeed acquired a greater resolution and become the fully incarnate 
Christ figure that he will remain for the rest of the narrative. 
In contrast, the Yepanchin family’s dinner party is the site of 
Myshkin’s failed incarnation. Like Alyosha in the monastery, Myshkin 
stands on the edge, looking out upon a world that promises harm. Alyosha 
has made a deep connection with a person in that world—Grushenka—but 
Myshkin possesses no such connection; he is adrift. His situation hearkens 
back to his condition in Switzerland; as he stands in the corner of the party, 
observing this “grand festival,” he continues to fear that he will remain an 
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outcast (Idiot 446). As then, he continues to “comprehend nothing” (446). 
Myshkin has no suspicion of concealed undercurrents of ulterior motives, 
corrupt histories, secret hatreds. His eyes dwell on the “superb artistic 
veneer” of everything (564). He does not suspect that this veneer might 
cover the lid of a coffin, concealing stale, rotting air. Distracted by society’s 
golden façade, he fails to comprehend its essence. As Myshkin treats the 
women in his life, so he treats the world. 
Myshkin is, however, increasingly desperate to enter reality, to make 
a human connection. “Choked with goodness” at the beauty that surrounds 
him, he longs to embrace the world as Alyosha does (Idiot 572). He longs 
to experience “fusion with the supreme synthesis of life,” like the wholeness 
Alyosha finds (237). But when he attempts to engage the other party guests, 
he unleashes a boisterous diatribe against the Catholic Church and asserts 
the preeminence of the Russian Orthodox Church. He longs to know others 
and to be known, but when he opens his mouth, a torrent of nationalistic 
ideology emerges. Seeing society as a beautiful two-dimensional image, 
and approaching it in fear, he can only engage it with abstract ideas. Just as 
Myshkin treats God as an intangible concept or image, so he also treats the 
world. 
When Myshkin finally lapses into unconsciousness, the physi-
cal parallels the spiritual. Myshkin inwardly withdraws from reality, and 
his true self remains hidden from those who might know him. His inner 
nature—once only revealed through his understanding of God—is now 
being manifested in his interactions, first with specific individuals, and now 
with society. In his fear, Myshkin has seen only images and contributed 
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only ideas; he has thus failed to engage reality. The would-be “Christ figure” 
never becomes incarnate.
Yet, incarnate or not, Alyosha and Myshkin must complete the 
Christ narrative. 
IV. Gethsemane
Shortly before the crucifixion, Christ prays on his knees in the 
garden of Gethsemane. He beseeches, “My Father, if it is possible, may this 
cup be taken from me. Yet not as I will, but as you will” (Holy Bible, Matt. 
26:39). In this moment, Christ is determining whether or not he must bear 
the cross, suffering for the sake of love. Determining that he must, Christ 
then goes on to endure Calvary, dying by crucifixion; three days later, he 
emerges resurrected from the tomb. Toward the ends of The Idiot and The 
Brothers Karamazov, Myshkin and Alyosha enter their own gardens of 
Gethsemane. But while Christ determined whether or not to bear his cross, 
each Christ figure must decide how to bear it; for each, the cross is inevita-
ble. Each man’s decision in his “Gethsemane” determines the nature of his 
Calvary, and ultimately, his duration in the tomb. 
We can interpret Alyosha’s and Myshkin’s Gethsemanes as being 
the homes of Lise Khokhlakova and Nastasya Fillipovna, respectively. Here, 
Alyosha stands before Lise—the “little demon”—who bears fragments of 
their broken betrothal (Brothers 489). Myshkin, on the contrary, beholds 
not an aftermath but a potentiality, with two polar paths before his feet. 
He considers Aglaya, whose character promises consistent attachment, and, 
simultaneously, Nastasya, whose turbulent nature promises a flux between 
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intimacy and alienation. For Alyosha and Myshkin both, a crucial time of 
decision has arrived.
The decision that unites each of these scenes, such that both can 
be called “Gethsemane,” is the following: Christ asked for reprieve in the 
garden of Gethsemane. He did not want the cross; he wanted its redemp-
tive result. Suffering was not an end; it was a means to a greater end: love. 
In Dostoevsky’s Christ figures’ Gethsemanes, each must determine his own 
ultimate purpose. Will he bear the cross for the sake of love, or for the sake 
of suffering as a perverse end in itself? 
Alyosha, when he abandons his novice’s cassock, does so realizing 
that suffering accompanies love; with Lise, however, he realizes that suffer-
ing—simply for suffering’s sake—is not something to choose either. Alyosha 
desires to heal Lise of her anguish. As with Grushenka, he is “kenotically 
attentive” to her, humbly emptying himself so that he can receive her reality 
(Contino 69). He promises to always love and weep for her; the two actions 
will be inseparable, for his love of her tortured soul will cause him to suffer. 
He recognizes, however, that he cannot heal her tortured soul by marrying 
her. To do so, in effect, would be to marry her suffering—to chain himself 
to it. For it would be pity, not romance, that would bind Alyosha to Lise 
now. This urge of pity would ultimately dishonor her and destroy him. 
Here, unlike with Grushenka, it is distance, as opposed to proximity, which 
allows for love—love of both Lise and himself. In order to love both Lise 
and himself, he must stay whole, and commitment to her would require 
that he be torn asunder. For this reason, when forced out the door, he 
leaves. In effect, this final action begins Alyosha’s Calvary. Alyosha bears the 
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cross of Lise’s suffering, the natural consequence of his love for her. How-
ever, he does not choose to bear this cross in a way that will destroy him. 
He is a Christ figure, not Christ; he can accept the cross, but in order to rise 
again, he cannot cling to it.   
On the contrary, Myshkin plans to marry himself to the suffering 
Nastasya. Faced with a choice between a woman who offers simple love—
Aglaya—and a woman who offers passionate suffering—Nastasya—he 
chooses the latter. Here, Myshkin again falls prey to a kind of aesthetic 
“intoxication,” whereby he continues to pursue beautiful images (Idiot 614). 
Myshkin is seduced by others’ picturesque suffering. It is not only Nastasya’s 
beauty that holds him spellbound, but also the “great deal of suffering” in 
her face (85). His desire to witness suffering is partly driven by a kind of 
visceral urge to experience pain, and, ultimately, to see death, because death 
appears beautiful. This morbid passion for Nastasya, akin to Myshkin’s 
morbid interest in the Holbein, reveals a psychological pattern that will 
culminate in his ultimate end in Rogozhin’s house, with his final attraction 
to both the dead Nastasya and her murderer reflecting the novel’s earlier 
foreshadowing. 
But while Myshkin is enchanted by the aesthetic nature of suffer-
ing, he is not content simply to observe it; he wants to heal it. He is drawn 
to Nastasya as to a “pitiful, ailing child,” not unlike his earlier interactions 
with Marie in Switzerland (Idiot 624). Myshkin himself believes that he 
loves Nastasya out of “pity” and “compassion” (458), “not love” (218). 
But in order to heal this suffering, Myshkin oversteps the bounds of pity. 
Instead, he attempts to heal through suffering. This urge seems to be a strain 
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of nadryv—a psychological phenomenon observed throughout Dosto-
evsky’s works. As Robert L. Belknap explains, “Nadryv has been rendered 
as ‘laceration,’ and is derived from rvat, to ‘rend,’ ‘tear,’ ‘burst,’ ‘split’… 
nadryv causes a person to hurt himself in order to hurt others, or, perversely, 
to hurt others in order to hurt himself ” (37-8). Edward Wasiolek further 
observes, “Nadryv is for Dostoevsky a purposeful and pleasurable self-hurt. 
. . . a primal psychological fact. It is the impulse in the hearts of men that 
separates one man from another” (160). Unlike typical nadryv, Myshkin 
has no intention of harming others; he does, however, have every intention 
of harming himself. His love is a kind of lacerative, romantic love, whereby 
he desires to help “the suffering” so much that he will undergo unnecessary 
suffering; this healing-by-nadryv goes well beyond what is required or even 
possible. 
Why choose to suffer? Myshkin mistakenly views suffering as his 
final opportunity for incarnation. On some level, he recognizes that incarna-
tion requires love. And he believes that suffering, in itself, will be the means 
to love. In Myshkin’s mind, if it does not hurt, it is not love. Thus, in a final 
act of desperation, he decides to tortuously indulge in suffering in order 
to enter and save the world. He chooses crucifixion, by itself, in order to 
achieve liberation from his perpetual loneliness. But suffering does not end 
Myshkin’s alienation; he wounds himself in order to heal others, yet, being 
wounded, he requires healing himself. Aglaya presents this opportunity to 
Myshkin. Aglaya offers a peaceful and intimate relationship, one that would 
free him from his solipsistic prison. Instead, he chooses to marry an incon-
stant and tormented woman. He bears a cross that will devour him. 
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The love of Christ that accepts suffering is Alyosha’s initial answer 
to Ivan’s challenge. In responding to Lise’s suffering, Alyosha embodies this 
response: he bears the cross of suffering out of love—choosing love and 
accepting suffering. On the contrary, Myshkin bears the cross in order to 
find love. As a result, he chooses suffering in itself, and denies love. Inflict-
ing suffering on himself—partly in an attempt to battle evil and suffering—
he actually compounds the problem of evil. For this self-inflicted suffering, 
too, may require a theodicy. In this attitude, one chooses the cross when 
offered a simpler and equally effective option. One chooses Christ in the 
tomb over Christ resurrected. This tomb is each man’s ultimate fate.
V. The Entombed Christ and the Risen Christ
Alyosha and Myshkin, having now accepted their crosses, reach 
Calvary. Arriving there, each re-discovers the problem of evil, but now in its 
real, incarnate form, the form in which it was embraced by Christ.  
At the funeral of Ilyusha, Ivan’s argument symbolically comes to 
life. Where before Alyosha philosophized about child suffering, he now 
stands in its presence. The twelve grieving children demand a response. 
Can Alyosha now offer an adequate response? This is Alyosha’s final test. 
Standing beside the stone under which Ilyusha was initially to be buried, 
Alyosha begins to encourage the children. “Let us remember his face, and 
his clothes, and his poor little boots,” he exhorts (Brothers 646). “Don’t run 
from reality,” he seems to be saying, “Don’t let grief drive you into forgetting 
your friend.” Even as he encourages them to face their current reality, how-
ever, Alyosha also urges them to anticipate a future reality, that of the life to 
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come: “Certainly we shall all rise again, certainly we shall see each other and 
gladly, joyfully will tell each other all that has happened” (646). Like Christ, 
Alyosha, the “resolute champion,” stands next to a stone under which no 
corpse resides. He brings hope to the myopic in the presence of the grave. 
And at the end of the novel, he walks out of the graveyard. The figurative 
Christ has entered the tomb and emerged again, bringing life to the twelve 
figurative disciples who surround him. 
Myshkin, too, enters a tomb: Rogozhin’s house. With the discovery 
of Nastasya’s corpse, the sepulchral element of Holbein’s painting has come 
to life, though the painting lacks its primary subject. Can Myshkin respond 
where he could not before? He cannot, and he remains entombed. Seeing 
such aesthetically beautiful suffering, he is mesmerized. Lured by the dark 
glow of this living portrait, he longs to be consumed by it, to become for a 
moment a brilliant, dancing ash. Thinking he is pursuing reality, Myshkin 
has always been preparing to return to the Holbein portrait. He leaves 
Switzerland like an image stepping from a frame. Yet he continues to see the 
world as an artwork, populated with beautiful images. He seeks to engage 
with picturesque pain through the emotional turmoil of self-inflicted suffer-
ing, but only becomes more distant. Ultimately, Myshkin’s final act is con-
sistent with this pattern. In the novel’s final scene, Myshkin strokes the face 
of Rogozhin, Nastasya’s murderer, and slips into insanity (Idiot 648). Thus, 
he becomes the subject of his own painting, the dead Christ of Holbein. 
In The Idiot and The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky sought to 
incarnate two Christ figures. One man—Myshkin—stands at a distance, 
beholding the world as a portrait that he both loves and fears. Ultimately, 
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this man chooses death for fear of life, and Dostoevsky returns him to his 
frame—a dead image. The other man—Alyosha—“falls to the ground” like 
a kernel of wheat (Holy Bible, John 12:24). Literally and figuratively, he 
kisses the earth, finding both seeds of faith and the ashes of suffering. It is 
for this realist embrace that, in the end, he rises as new wheat by the hand of 
Dostoevsky. 
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When Life Imitates Art: Aestheticism in The Importance of Being Earnest
Drake DeOrnellis
“THe truth is rarely pure and never simple. Mod-ern life would be very tedious if it were either, and modern literature a complete impossibility!” 
(Importance 828). With this declaration, Oscar Wilde’s sensational character 
Algernon unknowingly highlights a central concern not only of his age but 
of all who love art and literature: the relationship of truth and beauty in art. 
Writing late in the Victorian Age, Wilde stood at the head of the controver-
sial aesthetic movement, which challenged those arguing that art should pri-
oritize truth by imitating life and should teach its readers morality. Instead, 
aesthetes affirmed art’s intrinsic value and measured art’s success not by its 
truthfulness but by its beauty—understood by aesthetes like Wilde and 
Walter Pater as “something immediately experienced, felt upon the pulses—
not a bloodless abstraction … [it was] a blanket term covering the impres-
sions we receive and enjoy” (Johnson 3). Wilde pushed the aesthetic agenda 
still further: like art, good criticism should not seek to record an artistic 
object’s true nature but should record the viewer’s impressions of the work, 
regardless of accuracy, and life itself should imitate and become a beautiful 
work of art, even if this beauty is a lie. Unsurprisingly, Wilde’s convictions 
about the nature of art and criticism manifest themselves in his literary 
works, especially through his characters’ lifestyles in The Importance of Being 
Earnest, though close analysis of the play reveals a dimension of beauty that 
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Wilde fails to articulate in his own theorizing. Through their creation and 
interpretation of fictional identities, Jack, Algernon, Gwendolen, and Cecily 
become Wildean aesthetic artists and critics, ultimately nuancing Wilde’s 
theory by representing truth as a criterion for beauty. 
To begin, Jack Worthing, the main character of The Importance of 
Being Earnest, applies Wilde’s aesthetic theories by using several fictional 
identities for himself, thus transforming his life into a work of art. As 
Alexandra Poulain argues, throughout the play writing becomes a tool to 
recreate Jack’s identity. When Mr. Cardew discovered Jack abandoned in a 
handbag with no clues regarding Jack’s true identity, Mr. Cardew decided 
to “construct” a fictional identity for Jack by naming him and later making 
“him Cecily’s guardian in his will, literally creating the ‘serious’ Jack of the 
country” (297). Jack’s identity in this way resembles a work of literature, 
for it is both fictional and came into existence through writing. Interest-
ingly, understanding Jack as living literature corresponds well with Wilde’s 
thoughts on art and life, for Wilde argued in “The Decay of Lying” that 
“Life imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life” (320). Joseph McQueen 
explains Wilde’s point by saying, “[L]ife and nature reach out beyond them-
selves in order to find intelligibility through art” (868). Art, and particularly 
literature, offers a series of experiences that are unified and coherent, some-
thing life is not on its own. This experience of coherence brings pleasure to 
the viewer, and just as art offers this pleasure that the aesthetes associated 
with beauty, so also should life, according to Wilde.  Similarly, developing a 
fictional identity for himself and, in a sense, becoming a work of literature 
allows Jack to find this intelligibility that art possesses, for his new identity 
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is better able to clarify and to unify Jack’s experiences and sense of self than 
the sad reality that he was abandoned and has no knowledge of his origins. 
Thus, Jack’s life imitates and even becomes a work of art. 
Jack goes beyond creating one fictional identity for himself, how-
ever, and creates a fictional brother, Ernest, who further demonstrates 
Jack’s adherence to Wilde’s aesthetic understanding of life and literature. 
Jack pretends to be Ernest when he arrives in town, providing him with an 
escape from the responsibilities of Jack Worthing. Jack literally writes this 
identity into existence with the visiting cards marked “Ernest Worthing” 
that Algernon discusses in the first act of the play. Again, Jack’s life imitates 
art, for, like an author, he writes himself a fictional identity that then allows 
him to pursue the exciting life he cannot have in his day-to-day life as Jack 
Worthing. For Jack, taking on the role of author and writing his own identi-
ties for himself provides him with a “beautiful” life that the realities of life 
cannot deliver. Nevertheless, this fictional identity is false, demonstrating 
that in order to achieve the life he wants, Jack, like an aesthete, must prior-
itize beauty over truth. Thus, Jack exemplifies Wilde’s thesis that life should 
imitate art, and that art should be beautiful rather than truthful, by creating 
an intelligible and exciting life for himself through fictional identities.  
Like Jack, Algernon also creates fictional identities for himself and 
in this way applies Wilde’s theories about literature to his own life. Alger-
non has three identities: his real identity of Algernon, the invalid Bunbury 
whom Algernon uses as an excuse to escape social engagements, and Jack’s 
wicked younger brother Ernest, the persona Algernon adopts in order to 
meet and win the heart of Cecily. Both fictional characters clearly resem-
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ble art more than reality. Algernon’s supposed self-sacrificial tending to his 
invalid friend confers on Algernon’s character an air of nobility and kindness 
that does not often exist in real life, and Bunbury’s habit of always falling ill 
at the most convenient times for Algernon seems unlikely in everyday life 
but more probable in the realm of literature. Algernon’s character Ernest, 
meanwhile, closely parallels the anti-heroes of Romantic literature, wicked 
men who nevertheless fall in love with beautiful women and as a result 
change their ways. In this way Algernon writes his own story, and these 
stories mirror the romance and coincidence of art and literature far more 
than the occurrences of daily life, while also allowing Algernon to pursue 
the pleasures not permitted to him by the social customs of the day. Alger-
non certainly puts Wilde’s maxim into practice in his own life through his 
shameless employment of fictional identities.  
While the men of the play adopt fictional identities for themselves 
and thus create works of literature out of their lives, Gwendolen and Cecily 
become Wildean critics of these “texts,” preferring their own impressions 
over reality and creating their own works of art based on the works they 
critique. Wilde articulates this vision for what aesthetic literary criticism 
should look like in The Critic as Artist, in which he argues that “the high-
est criticism really is . . . the record of one’s own soul,” further adding, “His 
sole aim is to chronicle his own impressions” and “Who cares whether Mr. 
Ruskin’s views on Turner are sound or not? What does it matter?” (817-
818). For Wilde, criticism should not and cannot attempt to dissect a work 
in order to understand the one true meaning it communicates. Instead of 
seeking some sort of truth, the critic should share his own understanding 
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of the beauty of the work. Gwendolen, in her interpretation of the fictional 
“text” of Jack, follows Wilde’s advice. The “Ernest Worthing” that Gwen-
dolen falls in love with is, in effect, a fiction rather than a true person, and 
so Gwendolen’s interpretation of this character parallels the role of a liter-
ary critic. Interestingly, however, Gwendolen does not wait to interpret 
Jack until meeting him but rather develops her opinion of him beforehand: 
“The moment Algernon first mentioned to me that he had a friend called 
Ernest, I knew I was destined to love you” (Importance 831-832). At this 
point Gwendolen has had no interactions with “Ernest” and therefore has 
no evidence that her romantic impressions of him are true. Nevertheless, 
Gwendolen does not care about the validity of her interpretation of “Ernest” 
but rather indulges her own romantic impressions of him regardless of their 
truth. In this way Gwendolen acts as the ideal Wildean critic by interpreting 
Jack according to her own impressions and desires rather than some stand-
ard of reality. 
Not only does Wilde recommend that critics record their own 
impressions of beautiful artwork, but also that critics craft new works of 
beauty out of these works of art, another way in which Gwendolen con-
forms to Wilde’s vision of criticism. In The Critic as Artist, Wilde argues that 
“[the highest criticism] treats the work of art simply as a starting point for 
a new creation” (819). Criticism goes beyond recording one’s reactions and 
thus becomes a new form of art, as the critic takes a previous work and then 
creates more art out of it. Gwendolen’s romance with Jack certainly accom-
plishes this task. Sarah Balkin argues that Gwendolen “inhabits [an] author-
narrator role,” for she has in effect invented her own romance, falling in 
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love with Jack simply based on his name rather than allowing the romance 
to develop naturally (37). This decision to love Jack then informs all their 
subsequent interactions when they do meet in person, making it impossible 
for a flirtation and then a romance not to form. Balkin further elaborates 
that, “By narrating fictional accounts of [her] own [life], Gwendolen …
anticipate[s] and shape[s] [that life] and, in conjunction with the other 
characters, the action of the play” (37). Like Wilde’s ideal critic, Gwendo-
len builds on an artwork and creates a more beautiful work out of it—in 
this case, her romance with Ernest, which shapes not only her life but the 
lives of the other characters in the play. Thus, Gwendolen provides another 
example of how the characters of The Importance of Being Earnest practice 
aesthetic theory in the context of their everyday life.  
Cecily perhaps even more closely conforms to Wilde’s ideal of an 
aesthetic critic than does Gwendolen, as demonstrated by her lavish indul-
gence of her romantic impressions as she interprets Algernon’s fictional 
“Ernest.” Cecily develops an immense interest in Jack’s wicked “brother” 
Ernest, and though she has never met him, she falls in love with the person 
she imagines him to be and then, even more ridiculously, pretends to be 
engaged to him. By doing so, Cecily acts as a Wildean critic, interpreting 
the fictional Ernest based on her own whimsical impressions rather than 
on any sort of reality. Furthermore, she develops only positive impressions 
of Ernest, despite the understandable possibility of interpreting him nega-
tively, another aspect of Wilde’s philosophy of criticism. In his preface to 
The Picture of Dorian Gray, Wilde states, “Those who find ugly meanings in 
beautiful things are corrupt without being charming. This is a fault. Those 
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who find beautiful meanings in beautiful things are the cultivated. For 
these there is hope. They are the elect to whom beautiful things mean only 
beauty” (822). Not only should critics record their own impressions, but a 
good critic will recognize the beauty inherent in a work and will allow it to 
produce not ugly but only beautiful impressions within him. Interestingly, 
Wilde does not concern himself with finding true meanings in art, because 
he does not believe truth matters in art. Instead, there is only beauty or ugli-
ness. Cecily indeed is one of the “elect” that Wilde mentions, for not only 
is Ernest a piece of art in that he is entirely a work of fiction, but she reads 
into this text not the ugly meaning of a wicked man that many would read 
into it, but rather finds the “beautiful meaning” of an interesting, complex 
man for her to love and reform. Thus, Cecily proves to be the ideal Wildean 
critic by finding only the beauty rather than the ugly in Algernon’s work of 
art and basing her interpretation around these impressions of beauty. 
Like Gwendolen, Cecily not only ignores the truth by choosing to 
interpret her lover based on her own impressions and desires, but she also 
creates more art out of her interpretation, particularly demonstrated in her 
pretend engagement to Algernon. In keeping up the illusion of this make-
believe relationship, Cecily even goes so far as to write letters from “Ernest” 
to herself and to buy herself a ring and bangle on behalf of “Ernest” (Impor-
tance 849).  She also records in her journal the significant events of her 
engagement, including when she broke off the engagement for a week. 
Commenting further on these journal entries, Poulain argues that Cecily, 
like Jack, uses writing to create a new reality: “[T]he letters she writers to 
herself on behalf of ‘Ernest’ are fabrications which supplement his absence 
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and create a whole pathological being out of paper and ink” (295). In fact, 
she has created such a clear character for this Ernest that, “when Algy finally 
appears at the Manor House, he has only to impersonate the emotional 
character which she has created in writing” (295). Much like the critic who 
takes up his pen to create new art based on the art he interprets, Cecily 
uses writing to add new life to the fictional “Ernest.” The world she creates 
mirrors the plot of a romance novel, complete with wicked men who reform 
themselves out of love and the drama of broken and renewed engagements. 
Cecily, like the other characters, finds the world of art far more beautiful 
and compelling than the real world, and so as a critic she not only embraces 
the beauty of the fictional Ernest but continues to develop it. Furthermore, 
she knows that her fictional romance is false, but for her it does not mat-
ter whether it is true or false as long as its beauty brings her pleasure. Thus, 
Cecily joins the other characters in creating a work of art out of her life. 
However, though Gwendolen and Cecily at first willingly comply 
with Wilde’s vision for literary critics, after discovering the truth about 
Jack and Algernon, their relationship to Wilde’s aesthetic criticism becomes 
more complicated. When the girls believe that Jack and Algernon’s “art” 
corresponds to reality, Gwendolen and Cecily remain delighted with their 
lovers and find “beautiful meanings” in this art, following Wilde’s recom-
mendation for critics in his preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (822). And 
even when they realize the men have lied to them, they are still willing to 
find “beautiful meanings” in their words, even if their words do not actu-
ally correspond to reality but are a fiction, an art. When Algernon explains 
to Cecily that he lied about being Ernest so that he could meet her, Cecily 
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says to Gwendolen, “That certainly seems a satisfactory explanation, does it 
not?” (Importance 858). Gwendolen questions whether Cecily can believe 
Algernon, to which Cecily answers, “I don’t. But that does not affect the 
wonderful beauty of his answer” and Gwendolen replies, “True. In matters 
of grave importance, style, not sincerity is the vital thing” (858). Timothy 
Peltason analyzes this passage and connects the girls’ focus on style to “the 
central themes of Wilde’s criticism,” that is, the critic’s duty is not to explain 
the object as it really is but to build on the work and create a greater work of 
art (130-133). In other words, Cecily is satisfied with Algernon’s response, 
not because of its truthfulness, but because of the beauty she finds in it, 
and so she does not delve deeper into the true meaning behind his words 
but rather gladly accepts her own beautiful understanding of the situation. 
Gwendolen furthermore encourages this value of beauty over truth in her 
words. At first, then, Cecily and Gwendolen continue to abide by Wilde’s 
ideals for aesthetic criticism.  
Nevertheless, though the girls are willing to read beautiful mean-
ings into the “art” of the men without regard to truth, there is one point on 
which the girls will not move: the name of Ernest. After the girls whisper 
together about whether to forgive the men, they return to Jack and Alger-
non with the reply, “Your Christian names are still an insuperable barrier. 
That is all!” (Importance 858). The artistic stories that Gwendolen and 
Cecily have each devised in their own imaginations in response to Jack and 
Algernon hold such a grip on them that they refuse to sacrifice their ideals. 
The girls have followed Wilde’s theory of criticism and have created their 
own artwork in response to the men’s art, but when faced with the truth 
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that the men’s lives are indeed art, are “Life imitat[ing] Art,” and that their 
own criticism is thus art as well, they seem to reject Wilde’s theory. Now 
reality must conform to their art, which means that Jack and Algernon’s art 
must become reality as well. Only when Jack and Algernon declare “But we 
are going to be christened this afternoon” (858), thus transforming their fic-
tional identities into realities, do the girls forgive the men and accept them 
as fiancés once more. It is one thing to admire art when it is meant to be art, 
but for the girls of The Importance of Being Earnest, if life is to imitate art, 
this art must nevertheless become a reality. 
If The Importance of Being Earnest is a test case for Wilde’s literary 
theory, then Gwendolen and Cecily’s complicated relationship with their 
roles as critics implies that beauty and truth both have an essential role in 
interpretation, a claim that supersedes Wilde’s aesthetic criticism. Wilde’s 
play allows him to explore the implications of characters living as works of 
art and as critics of others’ art. However, at least in The Importance of Being 
Earnest, the dichotomy Wilde sets up between truth and beauty breaks 
down, with the two concepts becoming one and the same. Wilde criticizes 
art that attempts to be “true” to life, but Gwendolen and Cecily’s refusal 
to accept Jack and Algernon indicates that they do not find the falsity of 
the “Ernest” story beautiful. Instead, this story is only beautiful if it is 
also true. Of course, the actual truth is not beautiful to them—it is not a 
“beautiful” work of art that Jack is named Jack or that Algernon is named 
Algernon—but beauty cannot be beautiful unless it is true. Wilde’s test-case 
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demonstrates that his aesthetic literary criticism only goes so far. While art 
is beautiful, irrespective of its truth, and life seems more beautiful when it 
imitates art in this way, at some point truth becomes as valuable as beauty 
and even becomes part of beauty, a nuance Wilde does not draw out in his 
theorizing. 
Wilde experiments with his detailed aesthetic literary theory in 
The Importance of Being Earnest. Arguing that art’s purpose is not to tell the 
truth but to be beautiful, that life should imitate the beauty of art, and that 
criticism should create a new work of art out of the critic’s impressions, 
Wilde populates his play with characters who practice this philosophy in the 
fictional lives they have created for themselves. However, while Cecily and 
Gwendolen at first adhere to Wilde’s aesthetic standard for criticism, eventu-
ally truth becomes a criterion for beauty for the girls, demonstrated by their 
initial rejection of Algernon and Jack. Wilde may dismiss the importance 
of truth in art, but when his theory is applied to lives rather than art, truth 
becomes a necessity. Thus, Wilde’s theory proves limited—in the end, his 
characters find some form of beauty in truth that makes truth necessary 
even in works of art. Of course, the characters in Wilde’s play who draw 
out this point are, in themselves, art, and beyond that, potential objects of 
satire. Perhaps, after all, the relationship between truth and beauty expressed 
in The Importance of Being Earnest functions in the play merely to make the 
play beautiful, and funny. Yet however one chooses to interpret the play, 
Wilde’s characters in The Importance of Being Earnest embody Wilde’s aes-
theticism and provoke serious thought on the meaning of beauty and truth. 
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Looking Through, At, and Beyond in Thelma and Louise
Mercer Greenwald
At the beginning of Ridley Scott’s 1991 film Thelma and Louise, the title characters prepare to set off for a weekend trip to a friend’s cabin in the mountains. 
Thelma asks Louise what to pack and Louise tells her to take her husband 
Daryl’s fishing equipment. Thelma responds by saying “Louise, I don’t know 
how to fish.” Louise tells her “Neither do I, Thelma, but Daryl does it, how 
hard can it be?” (Khourie 9).1 Although Thelma and Louise never have the 
chance to fish, they both appropriate a variety of other stereotypically mas-
culine behaviors throughout the film. Louise shoots to kill and rejects the 
commitment of marriage; Thelma has sex for pleasure and robs a conveni-
ence store. Together, Thelma and Louise take narrative control of a classic 
masculine story.
Shari Roberts argues that the western and road movie genres pre-
sent shallow, caricatured visions of femininity, where female characters serve 
as plot-developing devices, aiding the hero in his own personal evolution. 
Women are limited to a set of male-envisioned tropes: the temptress, a “foil 
to the laconic, macho, male actor,” or the morally correct wife or daughter. 
In all of these cases, women “[figure] as helpless, parasitic embellishments to 
a masculine genre” (62). This tendency is inextricably linked to what Laura 
Mulvey describes in her seminal 1975 work as “the male gaze” (qtd. in Rob-
1  When referring to Thelma & Louise, I will be citing the 1991 screenplay by Cal-
lie Khourie, unless it is inconsistent with Scott’s film, in which case I will cite the 
film directly, indicating hour and minute with 00:00.
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erts 62). Mulvey argues that the dominant trends in Hollywood film serve 
the masculine unconscious: because most directors are male, the voyeur-
istic gaze of the camera is also masculine, most protagonists are male, and 
films are centered on masculine themes. In this way, the male gaze encour-
ages spectators to identify with the male protagonist rather than the more 
marginal female characters (837). Lorraine Gamman argues that through 
the use of female protagonists and women-centered themes, film narratives 
may appropriate patriarchal constructions and produce a “female gaze” that 
“articulates mockery of machismo” (15). 
On one level, Thelma and Louise does precisely what Gamman 
suggests; throughout the film, Thelma and Louise direct their gaze onto the 
men around them. Louise shows Thelma how to see through men’s façades, 
in order to see them for who they truly are: she teaches Thelma to recognize 
when men are hitting on her (when she meets Harlan), to understand that 
telling the police “the truth” will never work, and to realize that truckers 
do not always live up to their trustworthy reputations. Thelma certainly 
learns from Louise, but she also has her own experiences with the female 
gaze, which she directs at J.D.’s character as a sexual object. By the end of 
the film, though, Thelma and Louise do more than merely appropriate the 
male gaze. In the final scene, Thelma grabs Louise’s hand and looks beyond 
the men and forward into the Grand Canyon. Over the course of this paper, 
I will examine the way in which Thelma and Louise use the female gaze to 
look through, look at, and look beyond the men in the movie. 
Mulvey argues that in films that involve the “male gaze,” viewers 
cannot identify with a female character to the same extent that they identify 
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with a male character, because the man is the “representative of power” and 
the one who makes “things happen” (838). In Thelma and Louise, however, 
the female characters are more accessible to the viewer than their male coun-
terparts. Throughout the movie, the male characters are either left behind, 
objectified, defied, ridiculed, or even murdered, “presenting a significant 
challenge to the male gaze” (Gamman 16). Thelma’s husband Daryl is a 
prime example of this issue with male identification: we have no sympathy 
for him, and his self-importance engenders our spite and ridicule. At the 
beginning of the movie, when Thelma asks Daryl if he wants “anything spe-
cial” for dinner, we might think that Daryl defies Thelma by saying that he 
“may not even make it home for dinner,” so he “doesn’t give a shit” (Khourie 
7); however, Thelma is the one defying him because she knows that she will 
not be home for dinner after she leaves with Louise. When he says “you 
know how Fridays are,” Thelma is not naïve enough to believe this story. She 
responds by saying sarcastically “funny how so many people want to buy a 
carpet on a Friday night,” and it is clear to the audience, although maybe 
not to Daryl, that she is mocking him (7). With Louise’s guidance, Thelma 
is ultimately able to make it clear to Daryl she will no longer tolerate his 
behavior. When she calls him from Oklahoma, she tells him to “go fuck 
[himself ]” (59). Later in the film, Thelma sees through Daryl completely, 
even going so far as to manipulate him for her own purposes. She calls him 
on the phone from another rest stop, hoping to discern whether or not the 
cops have already questioned him. Daryl greets Thelma with uncharacter-
istic sweetness—one of the FBI officers had instructed him to answer the 
phone “like you’re happy to hear from her. Like you really miss her. Women 
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love that shit” (103). But Thelma is not so easily tricked; she hangs up the 
phone immediately and tells Louise: “He knows” (125).
At the start of the film Thelma has trouble seeing through the men 
around her, but Louise seems to possess this skill in spades. When Thelma 
and Louise stop at a night club, a man named Harlan approaches their 
table. He asks: “Now what’re a couple of Kewpie dolls like you doin’ in a 
place like this?” (Khourie 18). Thelma immediately explains their whole 
situation, while Louise tells him to mind his own business. When Harlan 
leaves the table, Thelma criticizes Louise for being too dismissive of Harlan, 
and “jaded” because of all of her “years of waitressing” (20). Louise patron-
izes Thelma for not being able to “tell when somebody’s hitting on [her]” 
(20). Louise’s suspicions about Harlan, however, are later substantiated 
when he attempts to rape Thelma. Louise threatens him with a gun, and he 
steps away from Thelma; but even with his fly down, exposed in the most 
literal of senses, Harlan still does not back down. Instead, he looks down the 
barrel of the pistol and tells Louise to “suck [his] cock” (29); Louise shoots 
him dead. 
The degree of certainty with which Louise decides to kill reveals 
that she is in an entirely different place from Thelma: she automatically sees 
danger in the presence of a man, even when his intentions seem honorable. 
This becomes further evident when Thelma proposes that they just call the 
police and “tell ‘em what happened” (Khourie 31). Louise has seen situa-
tions like theirs before and insists that this will do no good because “one 
hundred people” saw them “dancing cheek to goddamn cheek” (32). She 
asserts that they “don’t live in that kind of world,” where the police believe 
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women’s perspective on rape (32). Lynda Hart contends that “Thelma 
naively believes that simply telling the ‘truth’ will exonerate them. Louise 
has to teach her that the symbolic order is a masculine imaginary” (435). 
Louise recognizes that she and Thelma can no longer exist in the “symbolic 
order”; they cannot reintegrate into society. No good will come out of going 
to the police for Thelma and Louise—just like all of the men in their world, 
the police will only doubt them. Even when it becomes clear that Hal (the 
police chief ) wants to believe them, his good intentions do not exclude him 
from the “masculine imaginary” Hart describes. 
The final stage of Thelma’s evolution toward Louise’s well-developed 
ability to see through the men on the road takes place in their encounter 
with the truck driver. Thelma’s initial impression of the truck driver is 
that he is letting them pass him because truckers are the “best drivers on 
the road” (Khourie 111). But when he flicks his tongue at them, Thelma 
reacts with disgust. Later, when they encounter him again, he asks them if 
they “are ready for a big dick” and Thelma and Louise decide to teach him 
a lesson (Scott 01:49). They pull over, he follows them, and Thelma leads 
the confrontation. She says “I mean really! That business with your tongue. 
What is that? That was disgusting” (Khourie 169). Louise asks him how 
he would feel if someone did that to his wife or his mama. They ask him 
to apologize, and when he responds by yelling “Fuck you!” they shoot out 
his tires and then blow up his truck (170). By the time they are pulled over 
by the macho state trooper, Thelma takes the lead in teaching an overbear-
ing man his lesson. She puts a gun to his head, politely telling him to hand 
over his gun and get into his trunk. Thelma urges him to be “sweet” to the 
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women in his life because “my husband wasn’t sweet to me and look how I 
turned out” (149). Whereas the lesson Thelma and Louise taught the truck 
driver was disciplinary, aimed at a misdeed already committed, the lesson 
they teach the policeman is pre-emptive, less comic, and more brutal. When 
they force the policeman to get in the trunk, there is no more going back for 
Thelma and Louise.
The linear trajectory of Thelma’s progress toward a simple kind of 
mimicry of bad male behavior is complicated by the appearance, directly in 
the middle of film, of the hitchhiking cowboy J.D. Right after Thelma tells 
Daryl to “go fuck [himself ],” she trips over J.D., and almost immediately, 
he becomes an alternative to her pathetic, tyrannical husband (Khourie 
59). Thelma does not look through him in the way she is learning to do 
with other men; instead, Thelma looks at J.D., and she does so with desire: 
whereas Thelma tells Louise that “you could park a car in the shadow of 
[Daryl’s] ass,” J.D. has a “cute butt” (63). Thelma voices her desire for J.D.’s 
body in a sexually empowered way. She goes on to invite J.D. to her motel 
room late at night, and after a few games and a long, almost flirtatious 
discussion about J.D.’s armed robberies, they have sex. Margaret Carlson 
argues that the brief amount of time between Thelma’s attempted rape and 
her sexual awakening sends a problematic message about assault. She writes 
that this development suggests that:
the only thing an unhappy woman needs is good sex 
to make everything all right… It requires a breathtak-
ing midair somersault of faith to believe Thelma would 
be eager to take up with another stranger so soon and 
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would let him into her motel room and go limp with 
desire after he admits he robs convenience stores for a 
living (57).
But perhaps Carlson’s point encourages the conception of woman as a 
passive victim. Patricia Mellencamp makes the alternative observation that 
this is a liberating experience for Thelma because “sex is no longer a fantasy 
keeping Thelma captive or a secret key to identity” (149). As Glenn Mann 
argues, the episode provides empowering narratives for Thelma: “Not only 
does Thelma gain sexual liberation in her relationship with J.D.; she also 
gains the opportunity to play out his life story, to adopt a dominant male 
role when she performs her gun waving act which J.D. taught her” (41). In 
fact, one could argue that not only does J.D. liberate Thelma sexually, but 
he also empowers her economically when he describes how he goes about 
armed robbery—a technique that Thelma goes on to imitate later in the 
film. And when J.D. steals all of Louise’s money, he inadvertently pushes 
them into complete financial freedom: it is not until Thelma uses the infor-
mation that J.D. left her about robbing convenience stores that the women 
can be truly independent. Brenda Cooper argues that the “sexual encounter 
can be read alternatively, as the female gaze appropriating the male gaze” 
(295); as a result of her newfound ability to see through men, Thelma takes 
charge of her sexuality and her own narrative altogether. Louise, however, 
does not immediately realize the liberating effect that Thelma experiences 
with J.D; he retains her deep mistrust of men, regardless of their apparent 
intentions.
The only point in the film where we question Louise’s steadfast 
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resistance to male authority takes place when she is on the phone with the  
police detective, Hal. It becomes clear that Hal only wants the two women 
to make it out okay. He seems to be on their side, and when J.D. steals all of 
Louise’s money, he blames J.D. for putting them in the position of needing 
to commit armed robbery: “Do you think Thelma Dickinson would have 
committed armed robbery if you hadn’t taken all their money?” (Khourie 
121). When J.D. denies his accusations, Hal hits him several times over the 
head and says: 
There’re two girls out there that had a chance, they had 
a chance!... And you blew it for ‘em. Now they’ve got-
ten in some serious trouble, and for at least part of it, 
I’m gonna hold you personally responsible for anything 
that happens to them… and you’re gonna tell me every 
damn thing you know so that there’s a small chance I 
can actually do them some good. (122)
Hal is not the unsympathetic police officer that Louise anticipates; 
he wants to save them. Louise talks to him on the phone and he says that he 
“needs [her] help” to make everybody else believe that it was an “accident” 
(158). But she refuses to let him take them into custody, and she tells him 
that when she thinks about “incarceration, cavity search, death by electro-
cution, life in prison” she doesn’t know “if [she] wants to come out alive” 
(159). And then he tells her that he knows about “what happened to [her] 
in Texas,” Louise’s previous trauma, the exact nature of which is kept from 
the audience (Scott 01:45). Hart argues that Louise consciously decides at 
this moment not to “try to overcome her resistances and allow the sympa-
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thetic detective, who in fact does know her history, to ‘save’ her” (Khourie 
453). But this is not clear in the movie; when we learn that Hal knows what 
happened, Louise’s eyes well up and she goes silent. Just as we wonder if 
Louise will give up running, and perhaps submit back into the patriarchal 
order, Thelma urges her not to bail out now. Now it is clear that Thelma 
has completely “crossed over,” as she later articulates. When Louise loses her 
resolve, it is clear that Thelma can see through the police in a way that she 
could not before.  
Hal sets up J.D. as the villain from whom he must protect the 
two implicitly helpless women. But in fact, J.D.’s openly self-serving theft 
of the women’s money does more to set the women up for self-liberation 
than anything the police chief or Louise’s supportive boyfriend, Jimmy, 
could do. The relationship between J.D. and Thelma subjugates neither the 
female character to male narrative control, nor subjugates the man to female 
narrative control. J.D. functions as a narrative device that helps catalyze 
Thelma’s and Louise’s ultimate escape from the male gaze; specifically, he 
facilitates Thelma in her transition from looking at men to looking beyond 
them. This is especially visible in the use of camera angles throughout the 
film. For example, when J.D. first enters the film, the camera faces Thelma 
head on, and we see J.D. behind the car. As she applies her makeup in the 
rearview mirror, Thelma keeps her head facing forward while she looks at 
him through her side window. We see the seeds of Thelma’s desire for J.D. 
grow as her glances to the mirror lengthen in duration. The camera does not 
show us the view from the mirror until J.D. begins to approach the car—for 
that brief moment, Thelma’s view of J.D. is entirely hers. Although Thelma 
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is looking back at the man behind the car, she nonetheless keeps her head 
facing forward (Scott 02:05). 
This continuous look forward continues through the final scene, 
when the police line up behind the Thunderbird and neither woman looks 
back at all. Instead, the camera angle shows the women looking at each 
other and looking beyond, away from the audience, into the Grand Can-
yon. They look at each other and Thelma says: “Okay, then listen. Let’s 
not get caught” (Khourie 185). As Thelma tells Louise “Let’s keep goin,” 
her gaze is directed at Louise (Scott 02:04). And when Louise asks Thelma 
“What are ya talkin’ about?” (Khourie 185). Thelma glances over the 
precipice while Louise directs her eyes to Thelma, asking “You sure?” (Scott 
02:04). They exchange a long look, then Louise kisses Thelma, looks over 
into the Grand Canyon herself, and the camera zooms out as Louise steps 
on the gas. At the end of the film, Thelma and Louise are not focused on 
the men in their wake at all; their focus is only directed on each other and 
on what lies beyond.
The evolution of the ways Thelma looks through, at, and beyond 
men is more sharply defined within the scope of the movie than Louise’s. In 
the beginning of the movie, Thelma learns to see through men with Louise’s 
guidance: she exposes Daryl, Harlan, and the truck-driver for who they 
truly are. Thelma also learns how to look at men in a new way, as we see in 
the way she gazes at and talks about J.D. At the end of the movie, Thelma is 
the one who proposes the idea to Louise that they forget about the “army” 
of men lined up behind them altogether and look beyond (Khourie 180). 
This evolution is more difficult to track in Louise’s character, though. The 
88 GREENWALD
exact nature of Louise’s earlier trauma that shapes her attitudes towards men 
is not revealed to the audience. Her relationship to Jimmy is ambiguous, 
too: is she capable of trusting him, unlike other men? The audience does 
not have access to Jimmy’s character in the same way we have access to other 
men in the film. He is not comic like Daryl, or sweet like J.D. He shows 
violent tendencies, as when he knocks over the table in Louise’s motel room, 
but he also seems to care deeply about Louise. We also know that Louise 
has the ability to look beyond the men in her life: we see this in her deci-
sion to leave Jimmy in the first place, and in her moments of erotic valence 
with Thelma. Perhaps at the end of the film she has abandoned heterosexual 
relatedness altogether. In the film’s conclusion, the modes of looking leave 
the male gaze behind completely; in its void, both the subject and the object 
of the gaze are female. The final shot does not include Thelma and Louise 
plummeting to their destruction; on the contrary, it shows them liberated 
and frozen in the sky above the Grand Canyon. Thelma and Louise demon-
strates both cinematographically and narratively how life within the male-
dominated order and the abyss is a choice, and they choose the abyss. 
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